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In O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., a federal district court 
permitted a class action case to proceed on the question of whether 
160,000 drivers were misclassified by their employer as independent 
contractors rather than employees. The case has garnered widespread 
interest, making headlines across the country. Yet, it represents only 
one of many class action cases currently pending against technology 
companies in the modern economy. Indeed, similar systemic claims 
have already been brought against Yelp, GrubHub, Handy, 
CrowdFlower, Amazon, and many others. 
 
The courts have struggled in their efforts to address the proper scope 
of class cases brought against corporations in the on-demand 
economy. This is likely the result of a lack of clarity in this area as 
well as the unique fact patterns that often arise with technology-sector 
claims. Nothing has been written on this issue in the academic 
literature to date, and this Article seeks to fill that void in the 
scholarship. 
 
Navigating the statutes, case law, and procedural rules, this Article 
proposes a workable, five-part framework for analyzing systemic 
claims brought in the technology sector and sets forth a model for the 
courts and litigants to follow when evaluating the proper scope of 
these cases. This Article seeks to spark a dialogue on this important—
yet unexplored—area of the law. 
“The guys who invented the steam engine, if you met them you might say 
they were a bunch of arrogant assholes. But the steam engine still changed the 
world. It doesn’t matter.” 
– Bill Gates1 
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 1 Q&A: Robots, Uber and the Role of Government, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2015), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ed5ec9c4-1b37-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz3trC6MmtG 
[https://perma.cc/EDK3-GN4L]. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For better or for worse, Uber and Lyft have changed the world. These 
companies—which provide a technological platform that allows just about 
anyone to drive for hire—represent an emerging (but quite controversial) 
modern economy.2 This growing industry faces enormous legal challenges.3 
The class action litigation brought in O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc.—
                                                                                                                     
 2 See, e.g., Apply Now, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/drive-with-lyft [https://perma.cc/ 
8ECX-6LB9]; Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-
jobs/ [https://perma.cc/L7ZB-73P8]. 
 3 Marisa Kendall, Uber Battling More than 70 Lawsuits in Federal Courts, 
MERCURY NEWS (July 4, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_30091649/uber 
-faces-attacks-multiple-fronts [https://perma.cc/TEK9-B94C]. 
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and certified by a California federal court in late 2015—alleges that the 
company has been misclassifying its workers since its inception.4 The 
plaintiffs maintain that they should be treated as employees, rather than 
independent contractors, which would entitle them to a higher rate of pay and 
additional benefits—putting the company at risk for additional liability.5 The 
issue continues to make headlines as more technology companies join the 
growing number of businesses involved in this type of litigation.6 Worker 
misclassification suits have even found their way to the on-demand food 
industry as class action cases have been brought against GrubHub and 
DoorDash.7  
Individual cases brought against these emerging companies are entirely 
appropriate. But the class action mechanism—the aggregation of each of the 
individual claims into a single case—should only be allowed after much more 
careful scrutiny. Class action litigation on the independent 
                                                                                                                     
 4 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1, 
*37 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and denying in part 
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 
989, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (order granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings) (alleging misclassification of workers on a systemic basis under the California 
Labor Code). 
 5 See O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1; O’Connor, 58 F. Supp. 3d at 994.  
 6 See, e.g., Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 934 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (“Plaintiffs were classified by Instacart as independent contractors. They claim, 
however, that they are Instacart’s employees . . . .” (citation omitted)); Iglesias v. Homejoy, 
Inc., No. 15-cv-01286-EMC, 2015 WL 5698741, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) (order 
granting plaintiff’s motion for entry of default) (“The complaint alleges that Homejoy[, an 
on-demand cleaning services company,] violated its employees’ 
rights . . . by . . . misclassifying cleaners as independent contracts . . . .”); Loewen v. Lyft, 
Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 945, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (alleging wrongful classification of drivers 
as contractors instead of employees); Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968, 970 
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (alleging in a class action that Handybook was deliberately misclassifying 
its employees as independent contractors); First Amended Collective & Class Action 
Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 1–2, Singer v. Postmates Inc., No. 4:15-cv-01284 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Singer Class Action Complaint] (alleging the delivery service 
Postmates incorrectly classified couriers as independent contractors rather than 
employees); Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 1–2, Taranto v. Washio, Inc., No. 
CGC-15-546584 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 29, 2015) [hereinafter Taranto Class Action 
Complaint] (alleging that Washio laundry service, which “provide[d] dry cleaning and 
wash and fold delivery service through a mobile phone application,” misclassified Washio 
drivers as independent contractors); Amended Class Action Arbitration Demand ¶¶ 1–2, 
Tang v. Shyp, Inc., No. 01-15-0004-0358 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n July 17, 2015) (alleging 
that on-demand shipping service, Shyp, misclassified couriers as independent contractors); 
Patrick Chu, Labor Cases Filed Against Shyp, Washio, Postmates, S.F. BUS. TIMES (July 1, 
2015), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2015/07/01/shyp-washio-postmates-
sued-uber-lyft-caviar.html [https://perma.cc/7UVX-42T8]. 
 7 Class Action Complaint ¶ 2, Kissner v. DoorDash, Inc., No. CGC-15-548102 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Kissner Class Action Complaint]; Class Action 
Complaint ¶ 2, Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., No. CGC-15-548103 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2015) 
[hereinafter Tan Class Action Complaint]. 
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contractor/employee issue in cases that involve modern technologies is often 
self-defeating because it asks a “one-size-fits-all” question.8 There is often no 
uniform answer to this question for the extraordinarily varied workers who are 
typically involved. 
The O’Connor case does not stand as an anomaly. CrowdFlower recently 
settled a case for approximately a half million dollars on the 
employee/independent contractor issue.9 And a case was recently dismissed by 
another federal district court where plaintiffs argued that Yelp reviewers 
should be considered employees.10 We are beginning to see a piling-on effect 
with these cases. Many of these companies in the so-called “gig economy” are 
highly successful and represent an irresistible target.11 While the question of 
whether the workers are employees or independent contractors in these cases 
is a fair one to ask, there is frequently no single, broad-based answer to the 
question. The issue that we are seeing is not new. Over seven decades ago, 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge wrote, “Few problems in 
the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than 
the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial 
dealing.”12 This problem persists today, and we must be careful to handle it in 
a way that does not undermine job growth, technological advancement, or 
worker flexibility. 
This Article seeks to provide much-needed clarity to this confused area. 
This Article addresses the nuances of the on-demand economy, and situates 
them within the context of the class action mechanism. Navigating this area of 
the law—as well as the Supreme Court’s recent decision on systemic litigation 
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,13 this Article proposes a framework for 
analyzing whether aggregate litigation is appropriate for gig-sector cases on 
the employee/independent contractor question. 
                                                                                                                     
 8 See Amy L. Groff et al., Platforms Like Uber and the Blurred Line Between 
Independent Contractors and Employees: Facing the Challenges to Employment Law 
Presented by Seemingly Intermediary Platforms of the Modern On-Demand Economy, 16 
COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L 166, 171 (2015), http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/04dcd 
e30-9c10-4003-b663-f7f5f2cdec32/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/805ddc72-69b2-42 
6b-ad51-fe92be45434e/CLRI_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BEH-NG7Q]. 
 9 See Otey v. CrowdFlower, Inc., No. 12-cv-05524-JST, 2014 WL 1477630, at *1–2 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (order denying motion for approval of settlement without 
prejudice). 
 10 Jeung v. Yelp, Inc., No. 15-cv-02228-RS, 2015 WL 4776424, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 13, 2015) (order granting motion to dismiss, granting motion to strike, denying 
motion for sanctions, and denying motion for preliminary certification of collective action). 
 11 See, e.g., Tricia Gorman & Rebecca Ditsch, Q&A: The Uber Settlement and Its 
Impact on Worker Classification in the Gig Economy, WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & 
INTERNET, May 20, 2016,*1, *2, *10. 
 12 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944), overruled in part by 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 13 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
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Through an extensive review of the case law, federal statutes, and on-
demand economy, this Article provides a model for the courts and litigants to 
follow when evaluating whether there is sufficient “commonality” under 
recent Supreme Court precedent to proceed in a class action case. This 
framework sets forth five different elements that the courts and litigants should 
consider when evaluating class action litigation on the employee/independent 
contractor question. The proposed test helps determine whether aggregate 
litigation should be pursued in these technology-sector cases by exploring the 
importance of five critical components of the working relationship—the time, 
place, frequency, and manner of the work performed, as well as the pricing 
model of the business involved. 
There has been very little written to date in the academic literature on the 
question of the independent contractor/employee test for on-demand cases.14 
This Article synthesizes the cases, regulations, and statutes to bring some 
structure to this confused area. Where these cases are permitted to proceed, the 
framework offered here also provides helpful guidance on the proper size and 
scope of the class involved. 
This Article also takes the next important step of applying the proposed 
model to the class action in O’Connor v. Uber.15 It explains how the 
framework would apply in that particular context, outlining the importance of 
each of the elements in the test. The problem here is much broader than 
O’Connor and involves the entire technology sector. Given the high-profile 
nature of this class certification decision, as well as its likely influence on 
other cases, however, O’Connor provides a useful example for explaining how 
the model outlined here should be applied.16  
                                                                                                                     
 14 Cf. Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2016) (presenting a new approach to the problem of worker 
misclassification). There has been excellent recent scholarship on class actions more 
generally. See, e.g.¸ Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 
729, 755–58 (2013) (addressing recent trends in aggregate litigation); Arthur R. Miller, 
Keynote Address, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic 
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293 (2014) (discussing the status of class action cases); cf. 
Megan Carboni, Note, A New Class of Worker for the Sharing Economy, 22 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 11, 47 (2016), http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol22/iss4/2/ [https://perma.cc/Y 
X7S-NTYQ] (proposing a third category of work, the “dependent contractor” in the sharing 
economy). 
 15 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs’ motion 
for class certification). 
 16 See Bloomberg News, California Judge Sides with Ex-Uber Driver over 
Arbitration Clause, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/busine 
ss/economy/california-judge-sides-with-ex-uber-driver-over-arbitration-clause/2015/09/21/ 
7e54031a-6087-11e5-8e9e-dce8a2a2a679_story.html [https://perma.cc/G6GS-5WRC]; 
Chelsey Dulaney, Uber Ruling Adds More Drivers to Class-Action Suit, WALL STREET J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-ruling-adds-more-drivers-to-class-action-suit-1449699041 
[https://perma.cc/AQ9A-7QTX] (last updated Dec. 9, 2015); Mike Isaac et al., Seattle 
26 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
This is not to say that the proposed framework is exhaustive; indeed, the 
five factors are meant only to provide general, straightforward guidelines for 
the courts and litigants to consider to better focus the inquiry in this area. As 
cases continue to emerge in this area, and as other scholars begin to weigh in 
on the topic, the parameters of the test proposed here can be further revisited 
and refined. Similarly, the weight given to the factors suggested here will vary 
depending upon the facts of the particular case. This Article does not examine 
the well-traveled question of how the independent contractor/employee test 
should be analyzed.17 Rather, it addresses the more expansive issue of how to 
shape the proper scope of the class often involved in this type of litigation. 
This Article proceeds in several parts. In Part II, this Article sets forth the 
general guidelines for aggregate litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This Part further addresses the Supreme Court’s recent litigation in 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, explaining how the Court has redefined the 
standard for “commonality” under the Federal Rules. Part III examines the 
most important statute for worker classification issues—the Fair Labor 
Standards Act—which creates the federal standards for wage/hour claims. 
Part IV explores the federal district court decision in O’Connor v. Uber, which 
permitted the aggregation of a class on the worker classification issue. Part V 
examines the potential harm of the O’Connor analysis, the need for more 
clarity in this area, and other class action litigation currently pending in the gig 
sector. Part VI proposes a framework for analyzing whether class action 
claims should be permitted to proceed in technology-sector cases, and applies 
the analysis to the O’Connor decision. Finally, Part VII explores how Federal 
                                                                                                                     
Considers Measure to Let Uber and Lyft Drivers Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/technology/seattle-considers-measure-to-let-uber-and 
-lyft-drivers-unionize.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KT6H-HSRE]; Dan Levine, In U.S. 
Driver Lawsuit, Uber Must Live with Class Action Order for Now, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-tech-classaction-idUSKCN0T62IA20151117 
[https://perma.cc/HBH5-D9R5]; Tracey Lien, Uber Sued by Drivers Excluded from Class-
Action Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-
fi-tn-uber-lawsuit-driver-misclassification-20160104-story.html [https://perma.cc/CKJ7-
KSSY]; Laura Lorenzetti, Everything to Know About the Uber Class Action Lawsuit, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 2, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/02/uber-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/4K 
DQ-MU9G]; Reuters, Judge Expands Driver Class-Action Lawsuit Against Uber, N.Y. 
POST (Dec. 9, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/12/09/judge-expands-driver-class-action-
lawsuit-against-uber/ [https://perma.cc/29FB-X6BM]; Joel Rosenblatt & Pamela MacLean, 
Uber Judge Taps Brakes on California Drivers’ Suit Outcome, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-23/uber-wins-conditional-halt-
to-part-of-california-drivers-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/DJ34-X3DW]; Katy Steinmetz, 
Judge Lets Drivers’ Class Action Lawsuit Against Uber Go Forward, TIME (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://time.com/4019439/uber-judge-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/8G2F-6T3R]; Matt 
Thompson, The Class-Action Lawsuit Against Uber Is a Case to Watch, ATLANTIC (Sept. 
7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/09/the-class-action-lawsuit-against-uber-
is-a-case-to-watch/404116/ [https://perma.cc/9X2G-PNB4]. 
 17 See infra Part III (discussing how workers are classified under wage/hour law and 
setting forth scholarship in this area). 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)—issue class certification—can affect the 
analysis of class action cases in the on-demand economy. 
II. CLASS ACTIONS GENERALLY—SYSTEMIC LITIGATION 
Class action litigation is a complex process that has evolved over time. 
This Part examines the basic rules of aggregate litigation and explores how the 
Supreme Court has refined those rules. 
A. The Rules and Benefits of Systemic Litigation 
The class action mechanism has had a controversial history over the 
years.18 The benefits of the class action model are numerous. It provides the 
ability to resolve hundreds or thousands of legal claims as part of a single 
piece of litigation, thus substantially streamlining the judicial process.19 
Through aggregation, the courts and parties can achieve judicial economies 
which translate into substantial savings of time and money.20 By resolving a 
                                                                                                                     
 18 See Jeffrey H. Dasteel & Ronda McKaig, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: How 
Subjective, Ad Hoc Standards for Permitting Money Damages in Rule 23(b)(2) Injunctive 
Relief Classes Undermine Rule 23’s Analytical Framework, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1881, 1882–
83 (2006) (discussing controversy surrounding the standard used for determining if a 
limitation on classes seeking injunctive or declaratory relief applies); see also Martin H. 
Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy 
Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 545–51 
(2006) (discussing the issues in “litigating complex claims” in class actions); Alison 
Frankel, The Supreme Court’s Next Big Class Action Controversy: Ascertainability, 
REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/01/04/the-supreme-
courts-next-big-class-action-controversy-ascertainability/ [https://perma.cc/XY9X-YLHG] 
(arguing that upcoming cases before the Supreme Court require it to decide on an 
ascertainability standard for class action suits). See generally Adam N. Steinman, The 
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010) (exploring the controversy surrounding 
pleading standards following the Twombly and Iqbal Supreme Court decisions).  
 19 See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 18, at 545–46. 
 20 See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 477–78 (noting that aggregation, at least in theory, allows for 
lower individual costs); cf. Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 (N.D. Ga. 
1971) (“One of the purposes of the class action is to achieve economies of time and 
effort . . . .”); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 432 (2014) (“[C]lass action procedure is 
lauded because it arguably supports the goals of Rule 1 to achieve the just, speedy, and 
efficient resolution of large-scale complex litigation.”); Janet Cooper Alexander, 
Presentation at the Debates over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective Conference 
in Geneva, Switzerland, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United States 
(July 21–22, 2000) (abstract available at https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionale 
xander.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5S7-ZU4J]) (discussing aggregate litigation). 
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question only once, the entire process becomes far more efficient and much 
less cumbersome.21 
At the same time, aggregating claims into a single lawsuit presents 
numerous drawbacks. There is a concern that this type of systemic litigation 
will strip some potential plaintiffs of their day in court.22 The Supreme Court 
has held that—if done properly—class action litigation can still protect the 
rights of aggrieved persons that are foregoing the opportunity for individual 
litigation.23 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was put in place to help 
realize the many benefits of the class action mechanism while still preserving 
these rights of individuals.24 Under Rule 23(a), a proposed class must satisfy a 
number of specific requirements to be permitted to proceed. Specifically, the 
purported class must demonstrate sufficient numerosity, typicality, 
commonality, and adequacy of representation.25 Through these requirements, 
the Rules balance the competing benefits of systemic and individual litigation 
and allow only the more appropriate cases to be aggregated in the courts.26 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 36 (2011), http://scholarlycommons.law.nort 
hwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054&context=nulr_online [https://perma.cc/4C 
FB-W263] (noting that aggregate litigation saves “time and cost by resolving similar 
claims all at once”). See generally 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 1:9 (5th ed. 2011) (explaining that efficiency is one of the objectives of the 
class action device); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161 
(2015) (addressing the future of class action litigation); Mullenix, supra note 20, at 403–05 
(discussing the evolution of class action litigation, suggesting “that class actions are not 
dead but . . . just badly done,” and proposing reform in the form of a “simplified class 
action rule”). 
 22 See generally Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41–43 (1940) (discussing the interests 
of individuals in class litigation); Joseph A. Seiner, Commonality and the Constitution: A 
Framework for Federal and State Court Class Actions, 91 IND. L.J. 455, 467–68 (2016) 
(discussing class action litigation and the problem of ensuring potential plaintiffs are 
actually heard in court); Alexander, supra note 20 (explaining that class actions, in certain 
circumstances, may disadvantage individual plaintiffs because the plaintiffs would lack 
substantial voice in the direction of their case). 
 23 See Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41–43 (addressing tension between class action 
litigation and protecting interests of individuals); Joshua D. Blank & Eric A. Zacks, 
Dismissing the Class: A Practical Approach to the Class Action Restriction on the Legal 
Services Corporation, 110 PA. ST. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (noting generally that the Supreme 
Court recognizes that the drafters of Rule 23 intended to consider the rights of individuals). 
 24 See Blank & Zacks, supra note 23, at 10–12.  
 25 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); see also J. Douglas Richards & Benjamin D. Brown, 
Predominance of Common Questions—Common Mistakes in Applying the Class Action 
Standard, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 163, 163 (2009) (discussing class action standard). 
 26 See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 21, at 35 (“A class action is ‘an exception to the 
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only.’ Because a representative action runs counter to this fundamental principle, the 
legislature and judicial system have established rigorous criteria to ensure that departure 
from the norm is justified. The federal class action rule—Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
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In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken a more narrow view of 
systemic litigation involving workplace claims. In particular, in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,27 the Court expressed a reluctance to permit these claims 
where there was not overwhelming support for the commonality requirement 
of the test.28 
B. The Wal-Mart Test 
The Supreme Court has narrowly restricted class action employment 
claims in recent years.29 The centerpiece of the Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.30 Much has already been written on 
this case, so this Article only briefly summarizes the pertinent facts and 
holdings here.31 
In Wal-Mart, the Court considered whether a purported class of over a 
million current and former female employees should be certified where the 
workers alleged discrimination on pay and promotion issues.32 The case, 
which was “one of the most expansive class actions ever,”33 was brought 
against Wal-Mart, the country’s largest private employer.34 The plaintiffs in 
the case maintained that there was a unified “corporate culture” at the 
company that was biased against women and subsequently led to 
discriminatory decisionmaking.35 The plaintiffs further maintained that the 
discretion given to management-level employees to weigh in on pay and 
promotion issues was being exercised consistently in a way that negatively 
                                                                                                                     
Civil Procedure—sets out the requirements for when a party can represent others so that 
efficiency and due process are served. The courts must conduct a rigorous analysis to make 
certain the Rule’s requirements are met.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))). 
 27 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 28 See, e.g., id. at 349–52; Malveaux, supra note 21, at 37–38 (“In a 5–4 decision 
written by Justice Scalia, the conservative majority raised the bar for commonality—
arguably one of the easiest class action thresholds. Conceding that all it takes is a single 
common question to satisfy the requirement, the Court concluded that this criterion was not 
met.”). 
 29 See Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1344 
(2014). 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at 1347–50. 
 32 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. (“[Wal-Mart] operates four types of retail stores . . . . Those stores are divided 
into seven nationwide divisions, which in turn comprise 41 regions of 80 to 85 stores 
apiece. Each store has between 40 and 53 separate departments and 80 to 500 staff 
positions. In all, Wal-Mart operates approximately 3,400 stores and employs more than 1 
million people.”). 
 35 See id. at 345. 
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impacted female workers.36 In light of these facts, the plaintiffs alleged a 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects workers 
on the basis of several characteristics, including sex.37 
The federal district court certified the class, and the appellate court largely 
affirmed the decision.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether class certification was warranted under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(a).39 Specifically, the Court addressed whether the claimants 
satisfied the commonality requirement of the Rule.40 Under Rule 23(a)(2), 
plaintiffs must demonstrate sufficient “questions of law or fact” that are 
“common to the class.”41 According to the Court, this “common contention” in 
the case “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution.”42 
The question presented must therefore “resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”43 
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court found no 
commonality in the million-plus claims alleged.44 The plaintiffs failed to 
establish that the discretion exercised by management was done in a common 
way that discriminated against female employees.45 Indeed, there was no 
showing of “a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire 
company.”46 Given the “size and geographical scope” of Wal-Mart, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 36 See id. (“Importantly for our purposes, respondents claim that the discrimination to 
which they have been subjected is common to all Wal-Mart’s female employees. The basic 
theory of their case is that a strong and uniform ‘corporate culture’ permits bias against 
women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of 
Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers . . . .”). 
 37 Id. at 343. 
 38 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 347. 
 39 Id. at 342. 
 40 Id. at 349–52. 
 41 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 42 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 355–59. As the Court concluded, “[t]he only corporate policy that the 
plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s ‘policy’ of allowing discretion 
by local supervisors over employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the 
opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for 
a class action . . . .” Id. at 355. 
 45 Id. at 359; Malveaux, supra note 21, at 38 (“Conceding that all it takes is a single 
common question to satisfy the requirement, the Court concluded that this criterion was not 
met.”). 
 46 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 356. In a separate part of the opinion that is beyond the 
scope of this Article, the Court further concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
claims for backpay were improperly certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(2). Our [previous] opinion . . . expressed serious doubt about whether claims for 
monetary relief may be certified under that provision. We now hold that they may not, 
at least where (as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or 
declaratory relief.  
Id. at 360 (citation omitted). 
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found it “quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion 
in a common way without some common direction.”47 The plaintiffs had only 
put forth a “bare existence of delegated discretion,” failing to show a “specific 
employment practice” that “tie[d] all their 1.5 million claims together.”48 In 
sum, the Court concluded that there was simply no commonality in the case, 
noting that the plaintiffs were attempting 
to sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without 
some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will 
be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims for 
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I 
disfavored.49 
In short, simply allowing management discretion in making pay and 
promotion decisions is—in and of itself—insufficient to support a class action 
Title VII discrimination claim.50 This is not to say that discrimination did not 
occur in each of these cases or that the individual class members were not 
treated disparately when it came to pay and promotion issues. Indeed, each 
individual class member would still be allowed to pursue claims against the 
company (assuming that administrative and procedural requirements had 
otherwise been satisfied).51 The Court’s holding, then, stands for the 
proposition that, while discrimination may have occurred in individual 
instances, there was simply no glue holding all of the claims together.52 In this 
instance, individual, rather than aggregate, litigation was appropriate. 
More recent case law—most notably Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo—
may call into question how the commonality standard should be applied in 
                                                                                                                     
 47 Id. at 356. 
 48 Id. at 357. 
 49 Id. at 352. Indeed, citing to the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Kozinski of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Court agreed that the plaintiffs here 
held a multitude of jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable 
lengths of time, in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of 
supervisors (male and female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all 
differed . . . . Some thrived while others did poorly. They have little in common but 
their sex and this lawsuit. 
Id. at 359–60 (alteration in original) (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 
571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)). 
 50 Id. at 357; Malveaux, supra note 21, at 40 (“The Court claimed that merely proving 
that a discretionary system resulted in a statistical disparity was insufficient to demonstrate 
commonality, absent identification of a specific employment practice.”). 
 51 See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 366–67. 
 52 See id. at 352, 358–59. As the Court concluded, there was “no convincing proof of 
a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy,” and there was thus no 
“common question” in the case to be resolved. Id. at 359. 
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certain workplace cases.53 Nonetheless, the Wal-Mart case makes clear that 
this standard will now be applied much more rigidly in most class action cases.  
III. CLASSIFICATION QUESTIONS AND THE FLSA 
The commonality issue in Wal-Mart arose in the employment context, and 
much has been written on the extent to which the decision provides a more 
rigid standard for workplace class action cases.54 For technology-sector cases, 
the common employment law question, which the courts continue to face, is 
the issue of whether workers are employees or independent contractors.55 
Under federal law, if a company misclassifies a worker as an independent 
contractor, it can be subjected to back pay and liquidated damages.56 And, 
more potentially damaging to the companies involved, these types of claims 
necessarily implicate a class of workers. Where an employer misclassifies one 
worker, it will likely misclassify many others as well. After Wal-Mart, then, 
we should examine what factors these misclassified workers must share to 
satisfy the more rigid commonality requirement for class certification.57 A 
                                                                                                                     
 53 Tyson Foods, Inc., v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). Tyson Foods involved 
the question of whether an expert’s analysis of the number of hours workers spent donning 
and doffing was sufficient to support the certification of a class action under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. Id. at 1043–44, 1046–49. While the Court found that a jury could have 
concluded that the expert’s analysis was sufficient to prove the hours worked, the Court did 
note that it was not adopting “broad and categorical rules governing the use of 
representative and statistical evidence in class actions,” and that “[w]hether a 
representative sample may be used to establish classwide liability will depend on the 
purpose for which the sample is being introduced and on the underlying cause of action.” 
Id. at 1049. 
 54 See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 14, at 775–76 (calling the Wal-Mart commonality 
standard “exacting” and noting that it “cannot be squared with . . . Rule 23(a)(2)”); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Future of Classwide Punitive Damages, 46 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1127, 1143 (2013) (claiming that the Wal-Mart decision limited the possibility of 
certification for some classes with monetary claims); Sherry E. Clegg, Comment, 
Employment Discrimination Class Actions: Why Plaintiffs Must Cover All Their Bases 
After the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) in 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1087, 1108 (2012) (claiming that Dukes’ 
heightened certification standard could lead to a decline in federal class action lawsuits); 
see also Stephanie S. Silk, Note, More Decentralization, Less Liability: The Future of 
Systemic Disparate Treatment Claims in the Wake of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 67 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 637, 658 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart “has made it more 
difficult for plaintiffs asserting discrimination to proceed as a class”). 
 55 Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, 
Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
471, 481 (2016) (“And indeed, one of the chief legal issues that concern [the gig-
economy], one that has already triggered major litigation in this field, is precisely the 
classification of the workers involved as employees or independent contractors.”). 
 56 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)–(c) (2012) (noting that violators are subject to various 
penalties, including fines, imprisonment, back pay, and liquidated damages). 
 57 See generally Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 338. 
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discussion of wage/hour law in this area helps to frame this analysis more 
clearly. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is a federal law that provides three 
primary areas of protection.58 First, it establishes a minimum wage, which is 
currently set at $7.25 per hour.59 Second, it mandates premium pay for any 
work over forty hours in a particular week.60 Finally, it prohibits the 
oppressive work of children, establishing extensive child labor restrictions.61 
Coverage under the FLSA is broad, and almost all businesses must abide 
by the provisions of this federal law.62 Thus, most companies easily satisfy the 
test of being “employers” under the statute.63 A more difficult inquiry, 
however, is whether a particular worker is an “employee” under the law. Only 
employees are afforded the protections of the FLSA, and independent 
contractors have no avenue of recourse under this statute.64 
The independent contractor/employee distinction has caused substantial 
consternation over the decades since the FLSA was passed, and the problems 
of interpreting the statute persist to the present day.65 Under the FLSA, to 
                                                                                                                     
 58 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212 (providing three primary areas of protection for 
minimum wage, maximum hours, and child labor provisions).  
 59 Id. § 206(a)(1)(C). 
 60 Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 61 Id. §§ 203(l), 212. 
 62 See id. § 203(r)–(s) (defining broadly “enterprise” and “enterprise engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” which are covered by the FLSA); 
see also WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #14: COVERAGE UNDER 
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2009) (“Employees who work for certain 
business or organizations (or ‘enterprises’) are covered by the FLSA.”). 
 63 See DAVID WEIL, DEP’T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-
1, THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT’S “SUFFER OR PERMIT” 
STANDARD IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES WHO ARE MISCLASSIFIED AS 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 15 (2015); Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor 
Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of 
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1004–05 (1999).  
 64 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (defining “employee” generally as “any individual 
employed by an employer”). In an interesting gig-sector decision interpreting California 
state law, a federal court noted that the state “[l]egislature has decided that employees 
need . . . protections as a check against the bargaining advantage employers have over 
employees—particularly unskilled, lower-wage employees—and the corresponding ability 
employers would otherwise have to dictate the terms and conditions of the work.” Cotter v. 
Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying cross-motions for 
summary judgment). The court further stated, “[i]ndependent contractors do not receive 
these protections because they generally are in a far more advantageous position.” Id. 
 65 See, e.g., Saleem v. Corp. Transp. Grp., 52 F. Supp. 3d 526, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(finding that cab drivers were independent contractors rather that employees under FLSA); 
Harrell v. Diamond A Entm’t, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1343, 1354 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that 
nightclub dancers were employees under FLSA and thus subject to overtime pay); Wirtz v. 
Silbertson, 217 F. Supp. 148, 154 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (holding that persons who sold 
newspapers on commission were employees and not independent contractors). 
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“[e]mploy” means “to suffer or permit to work.”66 This overly broad, 
somewhat circular definition provides little guidance on the proper standard 
for coverage in many cases.67 To assist in resolving this ambiguity, the courts 
have developed numerous tests on the question to help better analyze the 
issue.68 There is often variation on the exact parameters of these tests, but the 
courts frequently consider: 
1) the level of control the employer maintains over the worker; 2) the 
opportunity for profit or loss maintained by the worker in the business; 3) the 
amount of capital investment the worker puts into the process; 4) the degree 
of skill necessary to perform the job; 5) whether performance of the job is 
integral to the operation of the business; and 6) the permanency of the 
relationship between the worker and the employer.69 
The major consideration of this test is the element of control.70 And, 
arguably, all of the other factors noted above play into the amount of control 
exerted by either the employer or employee. The more control a business has 
in the working relationship, the more the worker is likely to be defined as an 
employee.71 The more control the worker has, the more likely that individual 
is to be characterized as an independent contractor.72 The exact amount of 
control required—and the precise test used to gauge that level of control—
varies in the courts.73 The Department of Labor has recently provided 
                                                                                                                     
 66 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 67 Cf. WEIL, supra note 63, at 1 (“The FLSA’s definition of employ as ‘to suffer or 
permit to work’ and the later-developed ‘economic realities’ test provide a broader scope of 
employment than the common law control test.”). 
 68 See Means & Seiner, supra note 14, at 1526. 
 69 Id. (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987)); 
see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992). 
 70 See Hennighan v. Insphere Ins. Sols., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 
2014), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 500 (9th Cir. 2016); see, e.g., Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law 
Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 338 (2001). See generally Ash v. Anderson 
Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015) (discussing the importance of 
control as part of the test for employment status); Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 
F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). 
 71 See Carlson, supra note 70, at 338–43. 
 72 See id. at 339–40. 
 73 Compare, e.g., Perez v. Oak Grove Cinemas, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1234, 1242 (D. 
Or. 2014) (citing the use of a six-factor “economics realities test” that examines the right to 
control the manner of work, an employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on 
management, an employee’s investment in required equipment or tools, special skills, 
temporary or permanent work, and if work is integral to the alleged employer’s business), 
with Kalloo v. Unlimited Mech. Co. of N.Y., 977 F. Supp. 2d 187, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(advocating another form of the “economics realities test” that looks at the ability to hire 
and fire, work schedules, payment, and employment records). 
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guidance on how to evaluate the employee/independent contractor question,74 
but the issue is one that ultimately continues to be resolved in the courts.75 
The decades following the passage of the FLSA have seen a steady flow of 
development in the case law on the question of what it takes for an individual 
to satisfy the “employee” test.76 While the courts have taken varying 
approaches to the issue—sometimes with conflicting results77—the parameters 
of the test have been roughly established over the years.78 The cases arising in 
the modern economy, however, have pushed the boundaries of the “employee” 
definition and created widespread uncertainty in this area of the law.79 
Technology-sector cases have transformed the employment law question, as 
workers look far different from those employed in traditional brick-and-mortar 
facilities.80 The on-demand economy has only further put this area of the law 
into flux. Workers now perform services at home, on the road, on a part-time 
or full-time basis, and in many other ways never before conceived possible.81 
The courts have taken the now much-outdated definition of “employee” in 
the FLSA and attempted to apply it to this modern economy.82 As one federal 
court recently noted, this is like being “handed a square peg and asked to 
choose between two round holes.”83 I have previously explored the difficulty 
                                                                                                                     
 74 See generally WEIL, supra note 63. 
 75 See infra Part V (examining recent technology-sector cases where the worker 
classification issue has been litigated). 
 76 See generally Baker v. Barnard Constr. Co., 860 F. Supp. 766, 770 (D.N.M. 1994) 
(progressing towards a six-factor economic dependence test), aff’d sub nom. Baker v. Flint 
Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998); Wirtz v. Kneece, 249 F. Supp. 
564, 568 (D.S.C. 1966) (adding that the term “employee” is also not determined by 
“‘contractual labels’ which parties may attach to their relationship”); Fleming v. Demeritt 
Co., 56 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D. Vt. 1944) (delineating that the test is no longer common law, 
but dependent on the “history, terms and purposes of the [FLSA]”). 
 77 See generally Means & Seiner, supra note 14. 
 78 See id. at 1526. 
 79 See De Stefano, supra note 55, at 481. 
 80 See id. at 480–85. 
 81 See Greg Ip, As the Gig Economy Changes Work, So Should Rules, WALL STREET J. 
(Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-the-gig-economy-changes-work-so-should-
rules-1449683384 [https://perma.cc/9AAU-VHZF] (noting that Uber drivers can work at 
any time and for however long they desire); Arun Sundararajan, The ‘Gig Economy’ Is 
Coming. What Will It Mean for Work?, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian 
.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/will-we-get-by-gig-economy [https://perma.cc/6UU8-
3UR5] (claiming that a gig economy allows for a more blurred line between personal and 
business life due to the varied work environments); see also Jennifer Ludden, The End of 
9-to-5: When Work Time Is Anytime, NPR (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/s 
tory/story.php?storyId=124705801 [https://perma.cc/9KFW-GTSM] (discussing “results-
only work environments,” working from home, and flex time as growing types of work 
scheduling).  
 82 See De Stefano, supra note 55, at 498. 
 83 Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying 
cross-motions for summary judgment). As the Court discussed, “[s]ome factors point in 
one direction, some point in the other, and some are ambiguous.” Id. 
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of applying a decades-old test to cases arising in the gig sector, highlighting 
the importance of flexibility in the consideration.84  
This Article addresses a more expansive issue—the scope of the class 
action mechanism used to litigate these cases. Thus, this Article does not 
revisit the well-traveled ground of how the independent contractor/employee 
test should be analyzed.85 Instead, in those growing number of technology-
sector cases where the test is implicated, this Article looks at whether the class 
action model should be used to resolve the question. Given the individualized 
nature of these inquiries, this Article argues for a more limited, class-based 
approach. 
As noted earlier in this Article, class action cases have pervaded almost 
every area of the technology sector.86 The question most frequently addressed 
by these cases is whether or not the provider of services is an employee or an 
independent contractor.87 This Article attempts to provide the appropriate 
                                                                                                                     
 84 See Means & Seiner, supra note 14, at 1536–45. See generally O’Connor v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment) (“Arguably many of the factors in [the 
employee/independent contractor] test appear outmoded in this [modern] context. Other 
factors, which might arguably be reflective of the current economic realities (such as the 
proportion of revenues generated and shared by the respective parties, their relative 
bargaining power, and the range of alternatives available to each), are not expressly 
encompassed by the [current] test.”). 
 85 See generally Myra H. Barron, Who’s an Independent Contractor? Who’s an 
Employee?, 14 LAB. LAW. 457 (1999) (discussing classification of workers); David 
Bauer, The Misclassification of Independent Contractors: The Fifty-Four Billion Dollar 
Problem, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 138 (2015) (discussing the misclassification of 
independent contractors and its impact on the labor market, taxes, and other areas, as well 
as potential solutions); Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace 
Regulation: A Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 166–69 (2003) (discussing varying definitions of “employees,” and 
how they have changed over time); Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of 
Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661 (2013) (discussing a new theory of 
classification); Carlson, supra note 70 (discussing the evolution of tests to determine 
employee status, why previous tests have failed and will likely continue to fail, and a 
proposed solution involving statutory-based changes); Karen R. Harned et al., Creating a 
Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93 (2010) (discussing the classification of employees, analyzing 
current business and legal requirements/considerations, and proposing a “step-back test” 
approach for defining employment); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2011) (discussing classification standards); Deanne M. Mosley 
& William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of Employment Relationships 
in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS. L.J. 613 (1998) (discussing worker 
classification, tests for worker classification, and the importance of worker classification); 
Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights 
for “Dependent Contractors,” 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143 (2005) (analyzing the 
independent contractor/employee issue in the collective bargaining context).  
 86 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra Part V (discussing various class action cases brought in the modern 
economy). 
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parameters that should be used to help answer this question—as well as a 
model for analyzing the proper scope of the class. However, it is difficult to 
conceptualize this question in the abstract. Indeed, discussing the issue in the 
context of more concrete litigation is helpful when evaluating the proposed 
framework discussed below. 
The federal district court case of O’Connor v. Uber88 provides an 
excellent opportunity for addressing the class action litigation which exists on 
the employee/independent contractor question. The case is not addressed here 
to limit the scope of this Article, but rather to serve as a springboard for 
discussing the broader, more important question of the appropriate breadth of 
this type of litigation. 
IV. THE O’CONNOR DECISION 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to allow aggregate litigation transcends 
Wal-Mart and pervades all areas of the law. Indeed, recent Court decisions 
have cut back on the ability of plaintiffs to bring aggregate arbitration claims89 
as well as antitrust litigation.90 In light of this trend, it is interesting to see the 
O’Connor court permit class certification on the worker misclassification 
issue.91 Indeed, this lower court decision may conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s mandates in this area. The Court has clearly expressed its view that 
commonality must be narrowly construed in employment cases, and that 
aggregate litigation should only proceed where all of the elements of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been adequately satisfied.92 This is not 
to say that the Supreme Court was correct in its decision to create a heightened 
commonality standard (indeed, this Article takes no position on that issue). 
Given the new Wal-Mart test for commonality, however, it is difficult to 
reconcile the reasoning in O’Connor with the Supreme Court’s new 
heightened standard. 
As noted earlier, the number of modern technology companies involved in 
class action litigation on the worker misclassification issue is only growing.93 
A sampling of these cases (discussed in greater detail below) include 
aggregate litigation against GrubHub, Doordash, Handy, CrowdFlower, Yelp, 
                                                                                                                     
 88 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (order 
granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings). 
 89 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that 
the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws that may disallow contracts that prohibit 
class-wide arbitration). 
 90 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (creating a higher 
pleading standard that requires plausibility of the facts alleged). 
 91 See infra Part V.C (discussing other pending class-action cases in the gig sector). 
 92 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–51 (2011) 
(discussing the test for certification in an employment case). 
 93 See supra Part I. 
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and Amazon.94 In terms of prominence, however, there can simply be no 
comparison with the class action case brought against Uber, which has 
captured headlines around the globe.95 The case has the potential to change the 
very way that the workplace is structured, and how we consider the contours 
of the employment relationship. 
In O’Connor, a federal district court in the Northern District of California 
considered whether a class of drivers for a technology company should be 
certified on the question of whether their employment status was 
misclassified.96 Specifically, the court considered whether a putative class of 
160,000 drivers should be permitted to proceed where the workers used a 
technology platform provided by Uber to act as a transportation provider for 
customers.97 The putative class sought numerous damages as a result of being 
misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees and asked for 
any damages that flowed from this mischaracterization.98 More specifically, 
the class sought unpaid tips and gratuities that the company “uniformly failed 
to pass on,”99 in addition to reimbursement for expenses.100 Federal District 
Court Judge Chen appropriately noted that the proper question before the court 
was whether “the drivers’ working relationships with Uber [were] sufficiently 
similar so that a jury can resolve the Plaintiffs’ legal claims all at once.”101 
                                                                                                                     
 94 See infra Part V.C (discussing existing systemic litigation on the worker 
misclassification issue). 
 95 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text (citing widespread attention given to 
the Uber class-action case).  
 96 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and denying in part the motion 
for class certification). In an earlier decision, the district court specifically outlined the 
business model of the company:  
Uber provides a service whereby individuals in need of vehicular transportation can 
log in to the Uber software application on their smartphone, request a ride, be paired 
via the Uber application with an available driver, be picked up by the available driver, 
and ultimately be driven to their final destination.  
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 97 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1. In an earlier decision denying summary 
judgment, the court stated that it “concludes that Plaintiffs are Uber’s presumptive 
employees because they ‘perform services’ for the benefit of Uber.” O’Connor, 82 
F. Supp. 3d at 1135. The court further found that “whether an individual should ultimately 
be classified as an employee or an independent contractor . . . presents a mixed question of 
law and fact that must typically be resolved by a jury.” Id. The court also concluded that 
“because a number of facts material to the employee/independent contractor 
determination . . . remain in dispute, the Court denies Uber’s summary judgment motion.” 
Id. 
 98 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1–2. 
 99 Id. at *1. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at *2. 
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Looking to California law, the court further addressed the common law 
employment test that is used to classify workers.102 That test examines a 
number of factors in determining whether workers are properly characterized 
as independent contractors or employees. Similar to federal law, the most 
important factor in the test is the question of control.103 The court must thus 
closely examine “not how much control a hirer [actually] exercises, but how 
much control the hirer retains the right to exercise.”104 In determining control, 
the court looked to a number of different factors that could be helpful when 
evaluating this question.105 All of these factors largely mirror the federal 
examination of worker status under the FLSA.106 
In considering these different elements, the court ultimately examined 
whether these different factors determining employment status could be 
analyzed on a classwide basis.107 The court thus looked at whether the 
application of the control test could be considered across all 160,000 drivers 
when evaluating whether or not they were employees under California law.108 
As to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1), the court easily found 
                                                                                                                     
 102 Id. at *2, *5–6. 
 103 Id. at *5. 
 104 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *5 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 172 (Cal. 2014)).  
 105 Id. at *5–6. The court noted eight specific factors that should be explored, in 
addition to the “right to control work details,” in the employee/independent contractor 
determination:  
(a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the 
work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without 
supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the 
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the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be 
performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether 
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not 
the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee. 
Id. at *6 (quoting S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 
(Cal. 1989)). Some other factors that can be evaluated were also noted by the court, which 
include:  
(i) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial 
skill; (j) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his 
task, or his employment of helpers; (k) whether the service rendered requires a special 
skill; (l) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and (m) whether the 
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s business. 
Id. (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 407). 
 106 See supra Part III. 
 107 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *8. 
 108 Id. at *16. 
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numerosity to be satisfied given the large size of the Uber class.109 And, the 
question did not even appear to be contested in the case.110 
The district court struggled with the application of commonality under 
Rule 23(a)(2). In examining this question, the court noted the restrictive 
commonality standard so clearly enunciated by the Wal-Mart decision.111 The 
court concluded that this “rigorous” standard had been satisfied.112 In reaching 
this conclusion, the court found that the jury’s resolution of the classification 
question could be outcome determinative.113 In this regard, the court noted that 
if the “jury determine[s] that the class members here are not Uber’s 
employees, this class action will have reached its end.”114 On the other hand, if 
the trier of fact reaches the opposite conclusion, then the drivers “are likely to 
be entitled to relief as a class.”115 As to commonality, the court further 
determined that the “worker classification claim presents a common issue 
capable of classwide adjudication because all (or nearly all) of the individual 
elements of the . . . test themselves raise common questions which will have 
common answers.”116  
Addressing the final two components of the certification rules—typicality 
and adequacy of representation—the district court further found that these 
elements had been satisfied as to some of the claims in the case.117 The court 
expressed the overlap between these two elements and the adequacy 
requirement that the named plaintiff have “no conflicts of interest with other 
class members” and “will prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the 
class.”118 Examining these requirements, the court concluded that there was 
adequacy of representation and typicality as to the purported tip violations of 
California’s Labor Code.119 The court, however, could not find typicality on 
the reimbursement claim set forth by the plaintiffs and rejected aggregate 
litigation of this claim.120 
                                                                                                                     
 109 Id. at *7. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. at *8. 
 112 Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011)). 
 113 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *8. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. at *12–13. 
 118 Id. at *9. 
 119 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *9–13. 
 120 See id. at *13–15. According to the court:  
On the current record . . . the Plaintiffs have not provided the Court with sufficient 
information for it to be reasonably assured that what Plaintiffs purport to be giving up 
on behalf of the class members they seek to represent is not of such value to absent 
class members that the interests of those class members would be at odds with those 
of the named Plaintiffs. 
Id. at *15. 
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The court further looked to a number of factors specifically enumerated in 
California case law in deciding that the issue of whether the workers were 
employees or independent contractors satisfied the predominance requirement 
of Rule 23(b)(3)—and was appropriate for class certification.121 The court 
highlighted the lack of control that Uber had over driver schedules, noting 
that:  
[B]oth parties agree that Uber does not control any of its drivers’s 
schedules—all Uber drivers are free to work as much or as little as they like 
so long as [the] drivers give at least one ride every thirty days, and [another 
category of] drivers give at least one ride every 180 days.122  
In terms of routes or territories, the court noted that there was no dispute 
over the route individual drivers take with passengers.123 The court also noted 
that the rate of pay was “unilaterally” set by Uber and that the company would 
establish the rate of pay “without any input” from its drivers.124 And, among 
other considerations, the court emphasized that the company could fire 
workers without cause.125 Evaluating all of these factors, the court concluded 
that: “[I]t appears that common questions will substantially predominate over 
individual inquiries with respect to class members’ proper employment 
classification . . . . Indeed, every (or nearly every) consideration under the 
California common-law test of employment can be adjudicated with common 
proof on a classwide basis.”126 
In the thirty-seven-page opinion, the court gives limited attention to the 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision. Indeed, the district court’s citations to this case 
are only for the basic propositions that class actions represent an exception for 
similarly situated litigants to the general rule of individual litigation in civil 
cases, and that there must be at least one common claim for a class action to 
proceed.127 The district court does not address anywhere in its opinion the 
                                                                                                                     
 121 See id. at *16–30. 
 122 Id. at *17. The court went on to note:  
[W]hile Uber is correct that this factor will likely weigh in its favor on the merits, the 
fact that Uber admits that it exercises a uniform amount of control over its drivers’ 
work schedules (i.e., none) benefits Plaintiffs at the class certification stage because it 
proves that this factor can be adjudicated on a classwide basis.  
Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id.  
 125 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *18–19. In its decision, the court highlighted the 
factors discussed by the California Supreme Court in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. 
Department of Industrial Relations, 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989). Id. at *16–17. As the 
O’Connor court recognized, these factors tend to go to the issue of who has control in the 
working relationship. Id. at *5. 
 126 Id. at *30. 
 127 Id. at *4, *8. 
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restrictive commonality standard that was enunciated by the Wal-Mart 
decision.128  
There have been efforts to settle this matter. However, the district court 
rejected a $100 million dollar agreement between the parties as “unfair” to the 
drivers as “it low-balled potential claims under California law.”129 
V. PIERCING THE O’CONNOR CLASS ACTION MODEL 
A. The O’Connor Decision 
In O’Connor, the federal district court permitted a class action against 
Uber to proceed that included 160,000 litigants.130 The judge’s analysis does 
not properly consider the importance of the commonality standard after the 
Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision. The O’Connor case establishes 
important precedent, as other class action litigation is pending on the same 
question in similar cases brought against other companies in the technology 
sector throughout the country.131 The analysis used in O’Connor should be 
reconsidered, as it provides confusing guidance that gives insufficient weight 
to the Wal-Mart commonality standard. While it is only federal district court 
precedent at this time, the case threatens to create an unworkable model for gig 
sector class action cases, given the attention the litigation has received and the 
high-profile nature of the issues involved.132  
The analysis used by the court concludes that there is commonality in the 
matter because the resolution of the issue will help resolve the case.133 While 
it is true that if the employee/independent contractor issue is decided, it would 
greatly streamline—and potentially resolve—the matter, this is not the 
appropriate legal question to be asking when addressing commonality under 
the Federal Rules (particularly after Wal-Mart). Indeed, there are many issues 
a jury could weigh in on that would help clear the court’s docket. This does 
not mean that these issues are appropriate for class certification. 
The commonality test enunciated in Wal-Mart demands a far more 
detailed and rigid analysis than what the district court was willing to give in 
this case, as demonstrated by the district court’s sparing citation to the 
                                                                                                                     
 128 Id. at *8. 
 129 Joel Rosenblatt, Uber’s $100 Million Driver Pay Settlement Rejected by Judge, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-18/uber-
s-100-million-driver-pay-settlement-is-rejected-by-judge [https://perma.cc/WK65-6YEE]. 
 130 O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1. 
 131 See infra Part V.C (discussing examples of class-action claims brought against 
other technology-sector companies). 
 132 See Uber Drivers, UBERLAWSUIT.COM, http://uberlawsuit.com [https://perma.cc/5G 
EZ-RAE3] (compiling various links to news coverage of the O’Connor case); see also 
supra Part I (outlining coverage of the O’Connor case in various news outlets). 
 133 See O’Connor, 2015 WL 5138097, at *2. 
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Supreme Court’s decision.134 The district court acknowledges the restrictive 
nature of the commonality test enunciated by the Supreme Court, but it does 
not apply this more restrictive standard.135 
A more appropriate inquiry into the commonality standard would have 
looked at the Wal-Mart Court’s analysis of Rule 23(a)(2) and whether the 
plaintiffs sufficiently demonstrated “questions of law or fact” that are 
“common to the class.”136 According to the Supreme Court, this “common 
contention” in the case “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide 
resolution.”137 The question presented must, therefore, “resolve an issue that is 
central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”138 Here, the 
district court certified the issue of whether or not Uber drivers are employees 
or independent contractors.139 This question cannot be answered on a 
classwide basis, at least not with the massive 160,000 worker class presented 
by the O’Connor case. Instead, a more individualized inquiry is demanded in 
this situation. 
The problem with adjudicating this type of massive class comes from the 
variance of the workers themselves. The employee/independent contractor 
question is by nature a fact-intensive inquiry, and the work performed by Uber 
drivers is highly varied. Take the experience of one Uber driver, who detailed 
the variance in his own work schedule: 
I drove for Uber between March and July of 2014. I was also employed 
full-time as a barback at a local seafood bar in San Diego, California during 
that period. I joined the company to earn extra money in my spare time. . . .  
. . . . 
The initial draw to Uber was the flexibility to create my own 
schedule.140 
The driver further detailed the level of control and influence Uber exerted 
over his work,141 and his personalized account of employment at the company 
explains the individualized nature of working for this business. Workers will 
likely seek employment for a variety of reasons: extra money while working 
other jobs (as in this example), full-time employment to make a living, or 
                                                                                                                     
 134 See, e.g., id. at *4. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 
(2011). 
 137 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. The question presented must therefore “resolve an issue 
that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order 
denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 140 Memorandum from Colton Tully-Doyle, Former Uber Driver, to author (July 30, 
2015) (on file with author). 
 141 See id. (“My choice of hours was heavily influenced by Uber. . . . [E]arnings are 
slim outside the suggested time frame so I always drove within hours proposed by Uber.”). 
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simply part-time work while in school or pursuing other activities.142 The 
flexibility and diversity of individuals who pursue employment in this industry 
thus result in key differentiating factors between these workers.143 Trying to 
aggregate such individuals as part of a class in this industry is difficult, if not 
impossible, across such a broad swath of workers. 
As demanded by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, there must be “some 
glue holding” the case together.144 That bond does not appear to exist here for 
all 160,000 individuals, as workers differ on their hours, rate of pay, work 
schedules,145 and other critical factors of employment.146 This is not to say 
that a class could not proceed as to certain groups of workers with a similar 
employment make-up. Or, as will be discussed in greater detail below, an 
“issue class” could be pursued as to certain questions in the case.147 But 
aggregating a class of 160,000 workers with such individualized variances 
should not be permitted under the more rigid Wal-Mart analysis. 
This is not to say that the Wal-Mart Court got the analysis right—indeed, 
this Article does not take a view on this highly controversial Supreme Court 
decision. Rather, the analysis here looks at how—and when—technology 
sector claims should be aggregated in light of the Court’s heightened 
commonality standard. 
B. The Potential Harm in the O’Connor Analysis 
At first blush, it may appear that there is little danger in treating workers 
on an aggregate basis in gig-sector cases. While it is true that Uber is a multi-
billion dollar company that can likely withstand substantial litigation costs,148 
such cases do create potentially large business expenses for certain 
employers.149 In the face of this type of possible litigation, existing employers 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See id. 
 143 See infra Part V.C (detailing the different nature of workers in modern economy 
cases). 
 144 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011). 
 145 Cf. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(order denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment) (“Finally, Uber makes much of 
the fact that Uber has no control over its drivers’ hours or whether its drivers even ‘report’ 
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 146 Cf. id. at 1138 (“Among other things, Uber notes that drivers set their own hours 
and work schedules, provide their own vehicles, and are subject to little direct 
supervision.”). 
 147 See infra Part VII (discussing the issue of class certification). 
 148 See Mike Isaac & Michael J. de la Merced, Uber Turns to Saudi Arabia for $3.5 
Billion Cash Infusion, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/02/tec 
hnology/uber-investment-saudi-arabia.html [https://perma.cc/4K4A-TN9U]; Douglas 
MacMillan, Uber Drivers Suit Granted Class-Action Status, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 1, 
2015), http://www.wsj.com/Essays/uber-drivers-suit-granted-class-action-status-1441141539 
[https://perma.cc/2SDC-SLWK]. 
 149 See MacMillan, supra note 148. 
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may become more cautious about expanding operations or creating new 
employment opportunities, and prospective companies may even think twice 
about incorporating.150 
This is not to say that litigation costs should not be borne where 
appropriate, or that labor/employment laws are unnecessarily hindering 
business. Rather, the concern created by cases such as O’Connor is the cost 
and uncertainty that is generated by potentially inappropriate aggregate 
litigation (at least as defined by the Supreme Court). These costs can directly 
impact how the entire sector operates, as well as the growth of this particular 
industry. The threat of massive class action cases like we see in O’Connor will 
have to be considered when structuring a business model, and employment (as 
well as economic growth) will likely be impacted as a result. As already noted, 
this Article takes no view on the validity of the Wal-Mart commonality 
standard. Given the Supreme Court’s heightened view of the commonality test, 
however, a more careful consideration of class action cases in the technology 
sector is necessary. 
Many have argued that this type of case will serve as the death knell for 
the gig sector—restricting flexibility and imposing an outdated, rigid 
employment model on this industry.151 Such calls are clearly premature, and 
sometimes overstated. But these arguments do demonstrate the existing 
conflict between the emerging modern economy and the older, brick-and-
mortar employment model that has persisted for decades. Until the law evolves 
further, and the legal standards are clarified, it will be impossible to 
                                                                                                                     
 150 See, e.g., Kate Rogers, What the Uber, Lyft Lawsuits Mean for the US Economy, 
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understand the precise effect cases such as O’Connor will have on the 
employment landscape. 
This Article, then, does not argue that all class action litigation is 
inappropriate in the gig sector. Quite the contrary—such aggregate litigation 
should be allowed to proceed in many technology-sector cases. A clearer 
standard is needed to help the courts better understand when such systemic 
litigation should be allowed to proceed. This Article seeks to provide that 
framework. 
C. GrubHub, DoorDash, Amazon, and More 
Though this Article focuses on the existing litigation against Uber, the 
case really represents only the tip of the iceberg. There is also substantial other 
litigation pending against businesses throughout the on-demand economy. 
Many of these cases involve the question of worker misclassification and are 
worth brief exploration. These cases underscore the prevalence of this issue, 
and the increasing importance of finding a way to address class actions in the 
technology sector. 
1. GrubHub and DoorDash 
GrubHub and DoorDash provide on-demand delivery food services, 
allowing customers to order from local businesses through online and mobile 
applications.152 On September 23, 2015, delivery drivers for GrubHub brought 
a class action in California state court alleging that they were misclassified as 
independent contractors, when they should have been classified as employees 
for purposes of wage payment law.153 The drivers for GrubHub receive a flat 
fee for each delivery as well as any tip added by the customer.154 The drivers 
allege that they are employees because they sign up for shifts in advance.155 
GrubHub controls the drivers’ work by instructing them where to report, how 
to dress, where to go to pick up deliveries, and how to handle the food and 
timeliness of the deliveries themselves.156 However, GrubHub required the 
drivers to bear the expenses of their vehicle, gas, parking, and phone data.157 A 
similar complaint was also filed against DoorDash for misclassification of 
                                                                                                                     
 152 About Us, DOORDASH, https://www.doordash.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/EC47-
C27L]; About Us, GRUBHUB, http://about.grubhub.com/about-us/what-is-
grubhub/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/243Z-PV3L].  
 153 Tan Class Action Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6–7. 
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workers as independent contractors in California state court.158 These cases are 
both pending. 
2. Instacart 
Similarly, Instacart is an on-demand “grocery delivery service.”159 The 
company hires workers to purchase and deliver grocery orders for Instacart’s 
customers.160 The company has been extremely successful and boasted an 
impressive $2 billion dollar valuation in 2015.161 However, Instacart has been 
entangled in litigation over the classification of its workers.162 In February 
2015, several workers initiated a class action lawsuit in California’s state 
courts—later removed to the Northern District of California—claiming that 
Instacart misclassified the workers as independent contractors.163 The 
plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to a minimum wage, overtime pay, 
and employment-related expenses such as automobile maintenance, fuel, and 
insurance.164 The plaintiffs further alleged that Instacart asserted extensive 
control over its workers as evidenced by the company’s control over “when 
and where [workers] were to collect and deliver groceries,” the manner by 
which workers interfaced with customers, and the requirement that workers 
dress in clothing displaying the Instacart logo.165 Furthermore, Instacart fired 
workers at will,166 determined workers’ wages167 and the prices charged to 
customers,168 required workers to work in shifts,169 and constantly monitored 
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 163 See Class Action Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 
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 164 See id. ¶¶ 31, 39, 44, 51. 
 165 See id. ¶ 24.  
 166 See id. ¶ 22.  
 167 See id. ¶ 23.  
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48 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
workers’ actions.170 The courts have consistently granted Instacart’s motions 
to compel arbitration.171 
3. Amazon 
Amazon Prime Now provides a benefit to users of Amazon Prime that 
allows the members to place orders for same-day delivery in select zip codes 
through the use of a mobile application.172 The drivers of Amazon Prime Now 
filed a class action suit in California state court on October 27, 2015, alleging 
misclassification as independent contractors and failure to pay minimum 
wage.173 The drivers state that they work regular shifts for hourly pay in order 
to deliver only the packages that Amazon Prime specifically assigns to them, 
while wearing an Amazon uniform.174 Amazon provides the drivers with a 
smart phone to use for the deliveries, but drivers must provide their own 
vehicle and fuel.175 The drivers work fixed shifts in which they check in with 
the dispatcher to receive their package assignments.176 They can neither reject 
assignments nor request to work in a particular geographic area.177 Amazon 
determines the sequence of their deliveries as well as the routes and can track 
the drivers while they are out on delivery.178 The drivers do not have the 
ability to negotiate any aspect of their compensation.179 The Amazon Prime 
Now class action suit awaits possible certification by the Superior Court of 
California.180  
4. Yelp 
Yelp was founded as a means of connecting customers with local 
businesses.181 Through the Yelp platform, consumers can find local businesses 
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and leave reviews for the companies that they have visited.182 Business 
managers can set up accounts to post photos of their business and message 
customers.183 Yelp reviewers filed a class action suit in federal district court 
against the company alleging that the reviewers should be considered 
employees.184 However, the court granted Yelp’s motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim on August 13, 2015.185 The court emphasized that the language 
used by the plaintiffs to assert that they were “hired” by Yelp should 
reasonably be inferred to refer to a process by which any person can sign up 
on Yelp and submit reviews.186 
5. Handy 
Handy, previously Handybook, is an online platform that connects 
individuals looking for household jobs, like cleaning or handyman services, 
with independent professionals.187 Cleaning professionals book their work 
through the list of available jobs provided by the application.188 Handy retains 
control over the cleaning professionals through its ability to terminate at will 
and through its control over the location of the cleaning job and amount 
charged to the customer.189 These independent professionals filed a class 
action suit alleging that Handy was misclassifying its employees as 
independent contractors and failed to pay the workers overtime 
compensation.190 The complaint was filed on October 30, 2014.191 The court 
granted the cleaning service’s motion to compel arbitration.192  
                                                                                                                     
 182 See id. 
 183 Id. (“Every business owner (or manager) can setup a free account to post photos 
and message their customers.”); see also Lydia O’Connor, Yelp Reviewers File Class-
Action Lawsuit Claiming They Are Unpaid Writers, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/30/yelp-lawsuit-_n_4179663.html [https://perma. 
cc/PGL7-D2B7]. 
 184 See Jeung v. Yelp, Inc., No. 15-CV-02228-RS, 2015 WL 4776424, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 13, 2015) (order granting motion to dismiss, granting motion to strike, and denying 
motion for sanctions). 
 185 Id. at *3. 
 186 Id. at *2. 
 187 About Us, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/about [https://perma.cc/W8SW-67W4].  
 188 Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order 
granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration). 
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at 970; see also Maya Kosoff, Two Workers Are Suing a Cleaning Startup 
Called Handy over Alleged Labor Violations, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/handy-cleaning-lawsuit-2014-11 [https://perma.cc/BR53-
YCYQ]. 
 191 Zenelaj, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 970.  
 192 Id. 
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6. Postmates 
Postmates is a courier service that “connects customers with local couriers 
who can deliver anything from any store or restaurant in minutes.”193 Couriers 
have filed several class action lawsuits against Postmates for worker 
misclassification.194 A class action complaint filed in the Northern District of 
California alleges that Postmates misclassifies its couriers as independent 
contractors and fails to pay a minimum wage, overtime, and various expenses 
that an employer should incur.195 The complaint further alleges that couriers  
are required to follow detailed requirements imposed on them by Postmates, 
and they are graded, and are subject to termination, based on Postmates’ 
discretion and/or their failure to adhere to these requirements (such as rules 
regarding their conduct with customers, their timeliness in picking up items 
and delivering them to customers, the accurateness of their orders, etc.).196 
Couriers are responsible for many of their work-related expenses, such as 
transportation and phone costs.197 The class action “has been stayed pending 
mediation.”198 
7. CrowdFlower 
CrowdFlower is a company that provides data enrichment, data mining, 
and crowdsourcing.199 Customers upload their data onto the CrowdFlower 
website and set up instructions to create their job.200 Once the job has been 
                                                                                                                     
 193 About Postmates, POSTMATES, https://about.postmates.com/ [https://perma.cc/Q937 
-XPBC]. 
 194 See Singer Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 2; Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, 
Peppler v. Postmates, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-05145-RCL (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015); 
Complaint ¶ 1, Marable v. Postmates, Inc., No. BC589052 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2015); 
see also Katy Steinmetz, Homejoy, Postmates, and Try Caviar Sued over Labor Practices, 
TIME (Mar. 19, 2015), http://time.com/3751745/postmates-homejoy-try-caviar-lawsuits/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ATR-KMJL]. 
 195 Singer Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2–3. 
 196 Id. ¶ 21.  
 197 Id. ¶ 23. 
 198 Jessica Karmasek, Boston Plaintiffs Attorney Targets Startup Companies in Class 
Actions, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 27, 2016), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510743555-
boston-plaintiffs-attorney-targets-startup-companies-in-class-actions [https://perma.cc/WP 
3V-44EG]. 
 199 AI for Your Business, CROWDFLOWER, http://www.crowdflower.com [https://perma 
.cc/3B6P-665F].  
 200 Platform Overview, CROWDFLOWER, https://success.crowdflower.com/hc/en-
us/articles/201856129-Platform-Overview [https://perma.cc/UHJ4-L69K] (“When users 
log in to CrowdFlower and create a new job, the first option that appears is to load data 
into the job.”). 
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created, people will task on the job until it has been completed.201 Individuals 
that had performed some of these tasks for CrowdFlower brought a class 
action suit against the company alleging that they were misclassified as 
independent contractors and paid less than the legal minimum wage.202 The 
parties entered a settlement in the case in which defendants agreed to pay 
$585,507 to be distributed among the plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ counsel.203 The 
settlement was approved on July 2, 2015.204  
8. Homejoy 
Homejoy was an on-demand start-up that connected independent 
professional cleaners with customers.205 The company classified its 1,000-plus 
cleaners as independent contractors.206 At the outset, the company enjoyed 
considerable growth and raised a significant amount of venture capital 
financing.207 Despite its early successes, workers filed a series of lawsuits, 
including three class actions, against Homejoy, alleging that the company’s 
cleaners were improperly classified as independent contractors.208 Each 
complaint asserts that Homejoy exerted a substantial amount of control over 
its cleaners, and, therefore, misclassified its workers as independent 
contractors.209 A class action complaint filed on March 19, 2015 in the 
Northern District of California alleges Homejoy failed to compensate cleaners 
for overtime and work-related expenses that Homejoy should have 
reimbursed.210 A separate class action complaint filed in California state court 
alleges that the company’s cleaners could not “negotiate their pay,” and had no 
discretion over which homes to clean or the amount of time spent cleaning a 
                                                                                                                     
 201 Id. 
 202 Otey v. CrowdFlower, Inc., No. 12-cv-05524-JST, 2014 WL 1477630, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 14, 2014) (order denying motion for approval of settlement without prejudice).  
 203 Id. at *2.  
 204 Craig Johnson, Crowdsourcing Supplier Settles Class Action Lawsuit, STAFFING 
INDUSTRY ANALYSTS (July 8, 2015), http://www.staffingindustry.com/Research-Publication 
s/Publications/CWS-3.0/July-2015/July-8-2015/Crowdsourcing-supplier-settles-class-actio 
n-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/99W6-XCGK]. 
 205 See Lora Kolodny, Homejoy Raises $38M for House Cleaning on Demand, WALL 
STREET J. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2013/12/05/homejoy-raises-
38m-for-house-cleaning-on-demand/ [https://perma.cc/P6QN-R9U6].  
 206 See id.; see also Kia Kokalitcheva, Home Cleaning Startup Homejoy Bites the 
Dust—Literally, FORTUNE (July 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/17/homejoy-
closing-cleaning-google/ [https://perma.cc/6KEB-EH8N]. 
 207 See Kolodny, supra note 205. 
 208 Collective & Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 15–17, Iglesias v. 
Homejoy, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01286-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015); Class Action Complaint 
for Damages ¶¶ 1–2, Ventura v. Homejoy, Inc., No. CGC-15-544750 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 
16, 2015); Class Action Complaint ¶ 3, Malveaux-Smith v. Homejoy, Inc., No. 37-2015-
00005070-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2015).  
 209 See Class Action Complaint for Damages, supra note 208, ¶¶ 32–33, 44. 
 210 Collective & Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 208, ¶ 3. 
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home.211 Additionally, Homejoy could fire a cleaner at any time or place a 
cleaner on a “performance improvement plan[].”212 The complaint further 
alleges that Homejoy could change a cleaner’s schedule with very little 
notice,213 determined the cleaning fees,214 mandated a “minimum number of 
jobs” per week,215 and required cleaners to wear a shirt emblazoned with the 
company’s logo.216 Furthermore, the cleaners were required to adhere to a 
cleaning checklist provided by Homejoy and could not determine “cleaning 
tasks” within the home.217 In July 2015, Homejoy announced that it would 
cease operations primarily due to pending lawsuits over worker 
misclassification.218  
9. Washio 
Washio was an on-demand dry cleaning and laundry service that hired 
drivers to pick up and deliver laundry to customers.219 Washio drivers filed a 
class action lawsuit on June 29, 2015 in California state court alleging that 
drivers were improperly classified as independent contractors.220 The 
complaint claims that Washio required its drivers to adhere to rules dictating 
client interactions and how drivers should “store clothes in their vehicles.”221 
Additionally, Washio drivers were evaluated on how quickly they completed 
pick-ups and drop-offs, and the company could fire workers at will.222 The 
complaint further alleges that Washio required drivers to consent to an 
exclusivity agreement, which prohibited drivers from working for Washio’s 
                                                                                                                     
 211 Class Action Complaint for Damages, supra note 208, ¶ 43. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See id. ¶ 37. 
 214 See id. ¶ 44. 
 215 Id. ¶ 35. 
 216 Id. ¶ 39. 
 217 Class Action Complaint for Damages, supra note 208, ¶ 40. 
 218 See Kokalitcheva, supra note 206; see also Ellen Huet, Homejoy Shuts Down, 
Citing Worker Misclassification Lawsuits, FORBES (July 17, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/17/cleaning-startup-homejoy-shuts-down-citing-worker-misclassifi 
cation-lawsuits/#1006dcb87780 [https://perma.cc/L8XN-MBT8]. 
 219 See Brian Solomon, Washio, the On-Demand Laundry Startup, Washes Out, 
FORBES (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/08/30/washio-
the-on-demand-laundry-startup-washes-out/#97aa85a68361 [https://perma.cc/LW6F-
FY9T]. 
 220 Taranto Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 2; see Biz Carson, The Lawyer 
Fighting for Uber and Lyft Employees Is Taking the Fight to Four More Companies, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 1, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/postmates-shyp-and-washio-hit-
with-legal-action-from-contractors-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/6S2U-ENJM]; see also Class 
Action Complaint for Damages & Injunctive Relief, Bennett v. Washio, Inc., No. 
BC603067 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2015) (a separate case brought against Washio). 
 221 Taranto Class Action Complaint, supra note 6, ¶ 11. 
 222 Id. ¶ 11–12. 
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competitors.223 Washio ceased operations in August 2016,224 though the 
company cited reasons other than litigation for shutting down.225 
As these cases demonstrate, there is a vast amount of litigation against 
technology-sector companies on the worker-classification issue. This litigation 
has had differing results. Some cases have been allowed to proceed, others 
have been dismissed, others have settled, and still others have found their way 
to arbitration. 
More importantly, these cases emphasize the varied fact patterns that can 
give rise to technology-sector working relationships. While the ultimate 
question is one of control, there is no uniform set of facts in these cases that 
will help provide guidance on how that control should be measured. Indeed, 
these cases emphasize how this question is highly individualized in nature. 
With regard to control in this economy, we see that GrubHub controls where 
to report, how to dress, where to pick up deliveries, and how to address 
timeliness issues.226 Amazon Prime Now controls the application that drivers 
use, the appearance of drivers, and the rate of pay.227 Yelp apparently 
maintains almost no control over its reviewers.228 And, there is an additional 
panoply of businesses which have yet to see litigation in this area but that are 
ripe for a potential dispute on this question. 
Regardless of the potential company involved, the worker classification 
question will continue to arise in numerous contexts within the modern 
economy until more guidance is given in this area. This Article seeks to 
provide a framework with which to address these issues on a classwide basis.  
VI. REDIRECTING THE CLASS ACTION INQUIRY: WEIGHING INDICIA OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
The difficulty highlighted with litigating class action cases in many of the 
technology-sector jobs discussed above is, somewhat ironically, also one of 
the greatest benefits associated with this type of employment—worker 
flexibility.229 Workers in the gig economy enjoy an unprecedented amount of 
                                                                                                                     
 223 Id. ¶ 14.  
 224 See Solomon, supra note 219. 
 225 See id.; see also Shan Li, On-Demand Laundry Start-Up Washio Shuts Down, L.A. 
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TIMES (July 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/business/rising-economic-
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flexibility in many instances, and often choose when, where, and how to carry 
out their job duties.230 While this workplace flexibility often works to the 
benefit of individuals, it makes aggregation of claims far more difficult. 
Unlike a traditional brick-and-mortar type place of employment, or a factory 
assembly line setting, workers in the gig industry often do not perform 
identical services or work similar hours.231 
A. The Indicia of Employment Test 
The problem with O’Connor (and cases following its analysis) is the lack 
of commonality that often exists among workers in technology-sector cases. 
The key inquiry here, which will continue to be a question for years to come, 
is whether or not a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. But 
this question is very difficult to answer on an aggregate level—the workers are 
often too varied in these cases.232 This is not to say that in certain 
circumstances (or in particular employment settings) that workers cannot be 
aggregated. However, each case must be examined on an individualized 
basis.233 Indeed, there may be groups of workers that have similar employment 
characteristics that would allow them to be aggregated for purposes of 
systemic litigation. Or, there may be subclasses that would work in the 
particular litigation. The major point here, however, is that there is often no 
                                                                                                                     
4-9RX6]. 
 230 Id.; There’s an App for That, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), 
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James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2015), 
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T-RFJR]. Though this Article focuses on a handful of illustrative examples of class action 
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supra note 6 (aggregating cases). 
 231 See, e.g., Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, BUREAU 
LAB. STAT. (May 2016), http://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/what-is-the-gig-
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 232 See supra Part V.C (discussing specific examples of technology-sector litigation). 
The federal court in the Lyft case addressed the confusion in this area of the law, noting 
that: 
Perhaps Lyft drivers who work more than a certain number of hours should be 
employees while the others should be independent contractors. Or perhaps Lyft 
drivers should be considered a new category of worker altogether, requiring a 
different set of protections. But absent legislative intervention, California’s outmoded 
test for classifying workers will apply in cases like this. 
Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081–82 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (order denying cross-
motions for summary judgment).  
 233 Bauer, supra note 85, at 152–54 (discussing common law test for classifying 
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“one-size-fits-all”234 answer to this question for technology-sector cases. 
Rather, the best that we can do is to provide some general guidelines on 
how—and when—to aggregate these claims. 
This Article proposes a framework that helps identify those technology-
sector cases that would be appropriate for aggregation on the 
employee/independent contractor question. Through an extensive review of 
the case law, several factors emerged which help clarify which cases should be 
permitted to proceed on a systemic level. The key component of this 
framework is an emphasis on the level of commonality of the workers as 
required by the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision discussed above.235 Those 
workers that have more in common with each other share a number of similar 
characteristics, which are identified in the model proposed below. 
This framework sets forth five different characteristics that the courts and 
litigants should consider when evaluating class action litigation on the 
employee/independent contractor question. These characteristics should only 
serve as a guideline and are not dispositive. Each case—particularly in this 
emerging economy—is unique and should be evaluated on its own merits. The 
model below, however, is sufficiently comprehensive to help the courts 
navigate this complex area of the law. It also provides some basic guidelines to 
consider when evaluating the appropriate scope of a class on this commonality 
question. Each of the five factors below should be carefully considered by the 
court when addressing this type of systemic litigation.  
These factors can help shape a systemic class when considering the 
independent contractor/employee issue and should be examined when any 
aggregate litigation is proposed on this question. It is important to note that 
these factors should not be confused with the test discussed earlier for 
determining the existence of an employment relationship.236 Rather, these 
factors are intended primarily to help evaluate the more precise question of 
whether worker claims should be aggregated on the independent 
contractor/employment issue. Each factor should be evaluated separately when 
examining this issue, and the weight given to any specific factor will depend 
on the particular case. These factors are not exhaustive. Indeed, it is entirely 
possible that factors not contemplated here may still play a major role in 
shaping a proposed class. Nonetheless, the following framework attempts to 
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v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 799 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2015). The test suggested in 
this Article closely tracks the analysis I recently proposed on the independent 
contractor/employee question. Means & Seiner, supra note 14, at 1514–15. 
56 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:1 
provide some basic guidelines for considering how to aggregate a class in the 
technology sector. 
These five factors—which are unweighted—are set forth below: 
1. The Time that the Work Occurs. When an individual performs work is a 
critical component of that individual’s status as an employee.237 Thus, when 
aggregating claims, the courts should closely examine the timing of the work 
itself. If an individual works exclusively on evenings, that individual’s 
experience may be far different than someone who is employed only during 
the day.238 Thus, individuals who perform work at similar times will be more 
likely to satisfy the commonality component of Rule 23.239 Timing is simply 
one factor240—but an important indicia of employment241—and should be 
considered when grouping plaintiffs in systemic litigation on the independent 
contractor question. 
2. The Place Where Work Is Performed. The place where the work is 
performed is a critical factor which helps differentiate individuals.242 Workers 
will likely vary in where their job duties are executed, such as at home, in an 
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shifts). 
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employment arise. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350. 
 240 See Estate of Suskovich, 553 F.3d at 566; Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 
101 F.3d 487, 493 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 241 See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (including when an individual works as an 
indication of employee or independent contractor status). 
 242 See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (laying out 
“whether the ‘employer’ or the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the 
place of work” as a critical factor in determining whether someone is an independent 
contractor). 
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office, or even in their car.243 Those that carry out their tasks in a similar 
physical location will be far more likely to satisfy the commonality necessary 
to be part of a class action.244 Individuals who work at different locations may 
be too different from one another to warrant class certification.245 
3. The Frequency of Work Performed. Frequency is likely the most 
important factor in the five-part framework, as it helps clarify which workers 
are truly similar to each other.246 Frequency is a term that is malleable to the 
specific workplace, but in most contexts—as in the technology sector—it can 
be more simply defined as how often the work is performed.247 In the context 
of Uber, for example, the frequency of work would mean the number of hours 
that a driver performs her duties—how often the driver is actually on the road 
transporting customers.248  
The frequency factor—at least in the technology sector—is where 
employees will likely diverge substantially from one another.249 Some drivers 
might work forty to sixty hours a week, whereas other drivers may treat their 
employment as a part-time job, working only a few hours a week to make 
extra money on the side.250 Frequency of work can, and often is, driven by a 
number of different criteria.251 Individuals that are unemployed could see 
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being a full-time Uber driver as an excellent employment opportunity.252 
Individuals that are currently employed in other parts of the economy may quit 
their jobs to make more money at Uber full-time.253 Or, workers might have 
other full-time employment, be full-time students, or simply only want to work 
for the company for a limited number of hours per week.254 Irrespective of the 
particular worker’s situation, however, how often the work is performed will 
be a critical (and often overlooked) criteria for aggregation on the 
employee/independent contractor question. 
4. Manner of Work Performed. The manner of work performed can more 
simply be defined as how a worker performs her job.255 This factor is 
important, but often not likely to differ between workers in technology-driven 
jobs. In the Uber case, for example, courts could look at whether the 
individual drives her own car, or whether she utilizes a vehicle owned by the 
company. Or, the court could examine whether some workers perform their 
jobs under particularly high-stress conditions, whereas others do not face the 
same obstacles or difficulties. How a particular individual’s work is evaluated 
and/or supervised is another critical factor that forms part of this inquiry.256 
                                                                                                                     
(June 30, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/how-partnering-with-uber-can-spark-small-
business-entrepreneurship/ [https://perma.cc/8W26-2G5Z]. 
 252 See Can You Really Make Money Driving for Uber?, ONE MORE CUP COFFEE, 
http://onemorecupof-coffee.com/can-you-really-make-money-driving-for-uber/ [https://per 
ma.cc/HTH6-U6LV]; see also Claire, supra note 251; Hall, supra note 251. 
 253 See, e.g., Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, supra note 2 (“The best part about 
driving with Uber is that you can set your own hours. On the other hand, driving jobs like 
truck driving can have very long hours and strict schedules. The opportunity that works 
best for you depends on whether you want a traditional full-time or part-time job, or want 
to work whenever you choose.”). 
 254 See id.; Uber Driving Partner – A Great Opportunity for College Students, UBER, 
https://get.uber.com/p/college-student-driver-partner/ [https://perma.cc/ZDP9-R6BV]. 
 255 In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. (FedEx II), 869 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973 (N.D. 
Ind. 2012) (considering factors such as the right to control the manner and methods of 
performance, the mode of payment, the furnishing of material or tools, the control of the 
premises where the work is done, and the right of the employer to discharge); see also 
Kramer v. Cash Link Sys., 715 F.3d 1082, 1088–89 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that an 
employee’s choice to work from the office or home favored independent contractor status); 
Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Props., 878 F. Supp. 2d 744, 770 n.19 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“[T]he 
employer must control not merely the end to be accomplished, but in addition the means 
and details of reaching that end . . . .”); cf. Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 887 
F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1040–41 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (noting that the most important factor to 
consider is the extent to which the employer has the right to control the details of the work 
performed), rev’d and remanded, 754 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 256 In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-MD-527 RM, 2010 WL 597988, 
at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2017); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 283 F.R.D. 427, 
468 (N.D. Ind. 2012); see also In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. (FedEx I), 662 
F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (noting employer control as a critical factor). 
“[W]hether a particular state’s law looked to the right to control as distinct from the actual 
exercise of control” was determinative of FedEx drivers’ classification as independent 
contractors or employees. Id. Of the states examined in this case, only North Carolina, 
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Like the other factors, those that perform work in a similar manner will be 
more likely to satisfy the commonality component as defined by the Supreme 
Court. This factor should thus be carefully scrutinized when evaluating the 
scope of a particular class action in the workplace. 
5. Pricing Models. Price is a particularly unique component of the 
framework set forth in this Article.257 The other factors—time, place, 
frequency, and manner—all go to the core of how work is performed.258 
Pricing questions can reveal the level of control an employee exerts in the 
working relationship with the company.259 Those individuals who are able to 
set their own pricing models for their services will be far more likely to be 
independent contractors than those who do not have this amount of control.260 
Similarly, class actions on the question of the employee/independent 
contractor issue should be grouped among employees that have similar levels 
of control over setting their own pricing structures for their particular services. 
Those workers that have different levels of power in setting prices should not 
be considered as part of the same class on this question, as they are far 
different in their status as employees.261 
The five-part model set forth above is intended to serve only as a guide 
and to provide common markers for courts to look to when assessing the scope 
of a class claim. The framework addresses the appropriate breadth of a class 
on the question of whether workers are independent contractors or employees. 
The model should not be used on the more precise question of whether 
workers actually are employees or independent contractors.262 That question is 
beyond the scope of this Article and has been well-trodden in the academic 
literature.263 Nonetheless, the same factors used to shape a class action in this 
                                                                                                                     
Oregon, and Louisiana considered pricing models when determining class certification. See 
id. at 1088, 1100, 1106. 
 257 See FedEx I, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 1088, 1100, 1106; see also, e.g., Simpkins v. 
Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 203 S.E.2d 742, 745 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (defining the manner of 
work performed as how an employee goes about doing his job). 
 258 For example, the Restatement of Agency distinguishes the issue of an employer’s 
control from other factors concerning the manner in which work is performed and which 
are critical to distinguishing between employees and independent contractors. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“Those 
rendering service but retaining control over the manner of doing it are not [employees].”). 
 259 See Hennighan v. Insphere Ins. Sols., 38 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
(explaining that workers paid by the hour are typically employees and those paid by the job 
are independent contractors); see, e.g., Kibodeaux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 4 So. 3d 222, 
225 (La. Ct. App. 2009); McCown v. Hines, 549 S.E.2d 175, 177–78 (N.C. 2001). 
 260 See, e.g., Woodring v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 769, 776 (S.D. Miss. 2012); 
Mary Kay Inc. v. Woolf, 146 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. App. 2004). 
 261 See, e.g., Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1255, 1259–60 
(11th Cir. 2008) (considering the managers’ level of control in setting pay in assessing 
whether they were similarly situated for purposes of class certification). 
 262 Cf. Bodie, supra note 85, at 664–65 (attempting to define employees). 
 263 See supra note 85 (discussing literature on the independent contractor/employee 
classification issue). 
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area will typically be relevant to the ultimate question of whether a worker is 
an employee or an independent contractor.264 
Attempting to define an appropriate class on this issue can be a difficult 
task, and the model offered by this Article is simply one approach to this type 
of aggregate litigation.265 This model should serve as a guide to systemic 
litigation in this area of the law—one of many tools practitioners and the 
judiciary can use to help establish the parameters of this common type of class 
action litigation. This is not to say that there cannot be other approaches to 
class action cases, however, as there are surely other indicia the courts can 
look to when considering the independent contractor/employee issue.266 The 
model is thus not intended to be exhaustive, and serves as a single formulation 
to help better define this complex area of the law. This Article primarily sets 
out to spark a debate on the need for a test in this area, and this Article 
welcomes opposing views on what the factors of that test should look like. 
Additionally, the technology cases in this area are often highly 
individualized.267 The model offered here attempts to be broad enough in 
scope to help account for specific variances in the cases.268 However, the 
model is malleable and may need to be adjusted in specific situations that do 
not fit neatly within its parameters. As the modern economy is constantly 
evolving,269 the framework offered here must only be considered a guide—and 
some businesses may fall outside of the factors contemplated. Each case will 
thus present a unique set of facts and should be considered accordingly. 
In short, no model can account for all of the potential variances in a 
constantly changing industry. This Article offers a basic framework to address 
the bulk of the cases, but should be considered flexible and may need to be 
adapted to more unique or novel situations. Nonetheless, this model provides 
                                                                                                                     
 264 See generally Means & Seiner, supra note 14, at 1527. 
 265 See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 132–33 (2015); 
Julia Morpurgo, Note, Should Class Be Dismissed? The Advantages of a One-Step Class 
Certification Process in Unpaid Intern FLSA Lawsuits, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 765, 798–99 
(2014). For a discussion of one other such tool, the issue class, see infra Part VII. 
 266 For example, courts could also consider, among other factors, the level of training 
required, the continuity of the relationship, or any requirements for reports. See Barron, 
supra note 85, at 459; Morpurgo, supra note 265, at 798–99. 
 267 See, e.g., supra Part V.A (discussing the individualized nature of Uber drivers’ 
claims in O’Connor). 
 268 See supra Part V (discussing gig-sector class action cases). 
 269 See Larry Alton, Four Ways the On-Demand Economy Is Changing the Face of 
Business, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larryalton/2016/12/30/4-
ways-the-on-demand-economy-is-changing-the-face-of-business/#166d0b843aa5 [https://p 
erma.cc/ZM2Y-U9K4]; Charles Colby & Kelly Bell, The On-Demand Economy Is 
Growing, and Not Just for the Young and Wealthy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/04/the-on-demand-economy-is-growing-and-not-just-for-the-young-
and-wealthy [https://perma.cc/A27M-6HZD]; Mike Jaconi, The ‘On-Demand Economy’ Is 
Revolutionizing Consumer Behavior—Here’s How, BUS. INSIDER (July 13, 2014), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-on-demand-economy-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/AQ2M 
-WXWW]. 
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an important framework for evaluating the scope of much of the class action 
litigation in the modern economy. 
B. Applying the Indicia of Employment Test to O’Connor  
The proposed model set forth here is meant to apply to all cases arising in 
the technology sector. The proposed framework is broad enough to be adapted 
to each of these cases. However, it is helpful to understand the contours of the 
test by applying it to the facts of one particular situation: the O’Connor 
case.270 
When evaluating the framework in this context, we see that the time in 
which the work is performed will vary greatly across the Uber workforce.271 
Some drivers perform their services during the day, others at night, and some 
drivers work exclusively on weekends.272 Similarly, the place where drivers 
perform the work will vary as well.273 Some will drive in specific areas of the 
city or primarily near particular venues or attractions.274 Frequency differs 
among workers here too—some drivers will work full-time schedules while 
others will only spend a few hours a week driving for the company.275 The 
manner in which the work is performed can also vary—those driving during 
rush hour, high-peak times, or during nighttime hours will have a far different 
experience than those working during the day or on weekends.276 Finally, the 
pricing model appears to be consistent across the proposed Uber class, as the 
fares and reimbursements are established by the company itself.277 
                                                                                                                     
 270 See supra Part V.A. 
 271 Frizell, supra note 250; see also Hall, supra note 251. 
 272 See Can You Really Make Money Driving for Uber?, supra note 252. 
 273 See Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, supra note 2; Laura Peters, Uber Expands 
into the Area, NEWS LEADER (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.newsleader.com/story/news/local 
/2015/12/28/uber-expands-into-area/77970560/ [https://perma.cc/H9BT-2U8H] (discussing 
Uber availability in urban versus rural areas); Alina Selyukh, Uber Surge Price? Research 
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 274 See Peters, supra note 273; Selyukh, supra note 273.  
 275 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at 
*17 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and denying in part the 
motion for class certification); Frizell, supra note 250 (noting that Uber drivers do not 
drive that many hours a week, but in fact, “[a] majority (51%) of Uber drivers work 15 
hours a week or fewer. Only 19% of [them] are really driving full-time (35 hours per week 
and more) compared with 81% of regular taxi drivers and chauffeurs”). 
 276 The experience of workers will depend heavily on several individualized factors. 
See, e.g., Where to Drive: Houston, UBER, http://www.driveuberhouston.com/peakhours/ 
[https://perma.cc/J5N7-CDUS] (giving the peak hours and locations in which demand is 
highest in Houston due to factors such as night life and work rushes). 
 277 See Nicholas Diakopoulos, How Uber Surge Pricing Really Works, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/17/how-uber-
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As we see from the Uber example, then, perhaps the greatest advantage of 
the model proposed here is its simplicity. Through this model, we are able to 
quickly identify and assess some of the unifying and differing characteristics 
of the proposed class.278 We can readily identify what factors would make 
drivers similar—and different—from one another.279 We can find the “glue” 
holding the purported class together as demanded by the Supreme Court in 
Wal-Mart.280 Four of the five factors of the framework—time, place, 
frequency, and manner—highly suggest that allowing a single, aggregated 
class among all 160,000 drivers would likely be too excessive, at least under 
the Wal-Mart test.281 There is simply too much variance present to satisfy the 
commonality necessary for a class action claim under the Supreme Court’s 
new heightened standard.282 
This is not to say that a class action would never be appropriate against 
Uber (or in other technology-sector cases). Rather, the class action mechanism 
should be used to litigate several smaller systemic cases where workers are 
grouped together in similar classes.283 The courts and litigants must approach 
each case from the standpoint of commonality284—how workers can be placed 
in classes where they share sufficiently similar characteristics.285 The 
touchstone for this inquiry should be the five-part framework set forth above. 
If drivers work a similar number of hours at the same times of the day, in 
similar geographic locations, they are far more likely to represent an 
adequate—and fair—class of litigants. 
In the O’Connor situation, it is impossible to say how many class cases 
should be properly used to aggregate the workers (or whether subclasses could 
be properly utilized in the matter). It may be that five or ten classes of workers 
would be appropriate and would help to more similarly situate the workers 
together. This would still represent average classes of well over ten thousand 
                                                                                                                     
surge-pricing-really-works/ [https://perma.cc/FMX6-US3N]; How Are Fares Calculated?, 
UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/33ed4293-383c-4d73-a610-d171d3aa5a78 [https://perma.cc/ 
PD6Z-E33F]; Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s ‘Surge Pricing’ Works, TIME (Dec. 15, 
2014), http://time.com/3633469/uber-surge-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/ZHE5-Y9FQ]; Uber 
Moves: Columbia, SC, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/columbia [https://perma.cc/UK2 
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 278 See supra notes 250–56 and accompanying text. 
 279 See supra notes 250–56 and accompanying text. 
 280 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 352 (2011). 
 281 See id. at 352, 355. 
 282 Id. at 352. 
 283 Malveaux, supra note 21, at 44 (“Smaller classes are bound to be more 
successful.”). 
 284 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring that there be “questions of law or fact 
common to the class”). 
 285 See Malveaux, supra note 21, at 44 (“With 1.5 million potential class members 
nationwide, Dukes unquestionably tested the outer bounds of what it takes to hold a class 
together.”). 
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workers each,286 which are still massive cases for the company to defend 
against. If situated in the framework presented above, however, such classes 
would be far easier to conceptualize and would make the determination of 
whether such workers were independent contractors or employees much easier 
to resolve.287 Until we have a better idea of how many workers share similar 
characteristics with one another, however, it will be impossible to know 
precisely how many class cases should be pursued here.288 The exact number 
of cases is irrelevant; the more important consideration is a focus on the 
elements of the Federal Rules and making sure that all of the claimants share 
sufficient commonality.289 If this commonality is assured, then the cases will 
be far easier to define.290 
This will likely also mean that aggregation is inappropriate for certain 
workers. Many of the 160,000 drivers will work completely unique schedules, 
drive in particular geographic areas, or otherwise perform their services in a 
way that sets them apart.291 Such drivers should not be considered with the 
other workers here, and their claims should be litigated and resolved 
independently.292 Whether such drivers are employees or independent 
contractors must thus be considered on an individual rather than a class 
basis.293  
Again, it is impossible to know at this stage of the proceedings how many 
workers are independent enough to fall outside of a particular class of workers. 
However, where these drivers fail to share common characteristics with the 
other workers, their claims must be resolved separately.294  
It is important to note again that this Article does not take a position on the 
validity of the rigid commonality standard set forth in Wal-Mart. Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                     
 286 See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *1 
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 288 Through discovery and further analysis of the factors discussed above, the district 
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 289 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 
(2011) (interpreting the commonality requirement of federal rules). 
 290 See Wal-mart, 564 U.S. at 356–57 (providing various examples in which 
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 291 Hall & Krueger, supra note 246, at 10, 21. 
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Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues 
Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 299. 
 293 See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359–60 (holding that issues should be resolved 
individually where members of a class have “little in common but . . . [the] lawsuit” 
(quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting))). 
 294 See id. at 349–50. 
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given that standard, a more narrow grouping of workers is likely necessary 
under the heightened commonality standard adopted by the Supreme Court.295 
Others—like the district court in O’Connor—will likely argue that the 
commonality standard is already satisfied and that a 160,000 worker class is 
acceptable.296 My view is that the Supreme Court would reject this analysis 
given the Wal-Mart decision. 
C. Implications of the Proposed Model 
Adopting the framework proposed here would have several important 
implications for the courts and the litigants. There are a number of specific 
advantages of the model that are worth highlighting. Perhaps most 
importantly, the proposed framework offers a level of certainty to an otherwise 
confused area of the law.297 It navigates a complex field and breaks down the 
cases in this area into a workable five-part test for the courts and litigants that 
they can easily follow. The straightforward model thus synthesizes the law and 
Federal Rules in this area and allows the courts to aggregate cases pursuant to 
a much more simple formula.298 This is not to say that the goal of choosing 
appropriate groupings of workers could not be accomplished in the absence of 
the formula offered here. The proposed framework makes the process much 
more straightforward, however, and far less susceptible to error.  
While simplicity is an important goal and advantage of the test, the 
framework proposed here offers far more. It has the further advantage of 
assuring commonality in diverse cases frequently brought in the technology 
                                                                                                                     
 295 See Adam Klein et al., Individualized Justice in Class and Collective Actions, in 
BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 326, 327–28 (Samuel 
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employment law”). 
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1958); supra Parts III, IV. 
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sector.299 So called gig-sector cases are notoriously difficult to navigate, and 
finding a common thread with which to aggregate these matters can be hard to 
identify.300 The Supreme Court’s definition of commonality in the Wal-Mart 
case has made aggregating employment cases difficult under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.301 The Court’s heightened commonality standard can be 
difficult to apply to claims brought in the on-demand economy.302 The 
framework offered here helps assure that commonality is achieved in these 
difficult cases, and that the Supreme Court’s new standard is adequately 
satisfied.303 Quite simply, the framework proposed here makes certain that 
workers share enough similar characteristics to proceed in a class action 
case.304 
The proposed model also helps balance the interests of all parties in the 
litigation.305 By providing a fair test, it allows the scope of the litigation to be 
framed in an appropriate way.306 Similarly, the framework provides fairness to 
defendants, who can more precisely defend against this more focused class 
action litigation.307 The model proposed here is far more useful than the 
approach currently used in the courts, which essentially involves scattered 
attempts by the judiciary to make sense of a hodgepodge of case law in this 
evolving area.308 
This is not to say that there are not some drawbacks to the offered 
approach. Though the framework offered here would bring much-needed 
simplicity to this area of the law, it would also lead to additional litigation in 
some instances.309 As noted by the O’Connor example, the current class of 
160,000 Uber drivers would need to be broken down into smaller classes, 
leading to additional (albeit smaller) cases on the dockets of the courts.310 
                                                                                                                     
 299 See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1049 (2016); 
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And, this would also mean that individual, nonsystemic litigation would also 
be preferred in many gig-sector cases. More cases—both individual or 
otherwise—likely means more litigation time for the courts and the parties, 
and less efficiency.311 Nonetheless, the importance here is that the courts “get 
it right.” By assuring that only similar claimants with common characteristics 
are aggregated together,312 the framework offered here helps achieve a proper 
result under existing Supreme Court precedent. And, by proposing a more 
straightforward, streamlined approach, the model offers many efficiencies that 
are not currently realized by the current system. 
Additionally, some might argue that, by adding an additional framework 
to certain class action cases, the model proposed here adds an additional layer 
of complexity to an already complex process. While it is a fair concern that the 
framework offered here could make the class action process more difficult, 
that is not the intent of the model. Indeed, the factors suggested here are 
simply meant to serve as nonexhaustive, unweighted guidelines to assist the 
courts to help construct a proper class in gig-sector cases.313 The framework is 
not intended to introduce an additional rigid, inflexible test into an already 
cumbersome process. It is thus meant to serve as a tool to assist the courts in 
working through cases in an emerging, ill-defined area of the law.314 
At the end of the day, no approach is perfect. The model offered here 
simplifies a complex area of the law, proposes a straightforward framework 
for the courts to follow, and assures that Supreme Court case law315 and the 
Federal Rules316 are being followed. The approach should strongly be 
considered for this type of technology-driven litigation. 
As a final consideration, it is worth highlighting that the approach 
described in this Article could apply to cases brought outside of the on-
demand economy. The independent contractor/employee question pervades 
many areas of the law beyond the technology sector.317 While this test could 
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certainly be adapted to other areas of the economy, it was formulated 
specifically for cases brought in the technology sector. As this is the area that 
is currently the most divisive and complex, and as the cases are rapidly 
evolving in this sector,318 this Article attempts to bring clarity to this specific 
field. The considerations addressed here, however, could certainly be easily 
tailored to other areas of the law as well. 
It is also worth noting that this Article offers the first attempt in the 
academic literature to streamline gig-sector class action cases. As such, it 
primarily attempts to open a dialogue on this topic. As already noted, the 
factors here should not be considered exclusive, and others are encouraged to 
weigh in on possible elements that could be used to help define systemic 
litigation in this area. Others may even disagree over how much weight should 
be assigned to particular factors (or may even take issue with some of the 
elements that have been proposed here).319 The framework offered here is thus 
a starting point. The courts, litigants, and others in the academic community 
should further attempt to find ways to simplify this confusing process and 
bring clarity to these often cumbersome class action cases. 
VII. A NOTE ABOUT THE ISSUE CLASS 
This Article seeks to develop a framework for litigating class action claims 
on the employee/independent contractor question in technology-driven cases. 
The framework helps define classes of workers who can litigate systemically 
and thus assists in resolving their claims.320 While the model here proposes a 
way for workers to bring their cases together, there is another approach to this 
type of litigation that is often overlooked: issue class certification.321 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4) allows for issue class 
certification where specific issue(s) can be resolved on a classwide basis.322 
The Rule allows a particular issue to be resolved in an entire class of cases, 
while still permitting these cases to proceed individually on the other issues 
involved.323 Under Rule 23(c)(4), “[w]hen appropriate, an action may be 
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”324 
Issue class certification has the advantage of resolving specific issues across a 
                                                                                                                     
volunteers); Juino v. Livingston Par. Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(same with volunteer firefighters); Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 257 
(4th Cir. 1997) (same with a physician in the healthcare industry). 
 318 See supra Part V (outlining complexities of other technology-sector litigation). 
 319 See, e.g., Morpurgo, supra note 265, at 798–99 (proposing an eight factor test for 
class certification under the FLSA). 
 320 See supra Parts III, VI.A. 
 321 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); Seiner, supra note 265, at 122–23. 
 322 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); see also Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: 
Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1588 (2011) (discussing 
issue class certifications under federal rules). 
 323 See Farleigh, supra note 322, at 1624, 1624 n.250. 
 324 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
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broad spectrum of cases a single time, while not requiring the complete 
resolution of the other facts or issues involved in individual cases.325 Unlike 
other class action cases, claims brought under Rule 23(c)(4) do not “involve 
‘an all-or-nothing decision to aggregate individual cases.’”326 Rather, specific 
issues can be addressed that are common to a number of cases, while allowing 
the rest of each claim to proceed individually.327 
Issue class certification tends to be appropriate when “there are common 
issues present in the case that would apply to the entire class, even where other 
questions will need to be resolved individually in specific cases.”328 
Technology-driven cases often fit squarely within these parameters, as many 
of the workers share a basic common set of facts but have been harmed in 
varying ways.  
In the O’Connor case, for example, drivers have many overlapping 
commonalities which include using the same technology platform, having 
similar pay/compensation schemes, and sharing other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of the working relationship.329 The drivers also have suffered 
varying levels of harm.330 As noted earlier, these workers have a number of 
identifiable differences with regard to how and when they perform their 
services, leading to differing amounts of damages.331 As further noted, these 
drivers perform their duties in a number of different locations,332 at differing 
times,333 and under varying conditions.334 Issue class certification would thus 
often be appropriate in technology-sector cases. These types of cases often 
offer overlapping legal issues and varying factual nuances. Rule 23(c)(4) fits 
perfectly with these types of cases to allow the courts to streamline this type of 
litigation by resolving the specific overlapping issues a single time, while still 
allowing the differing facts and issues in the case to be resolved 
independently.335 
                                                                                                                     
 325 Seiner, supra note 265, at 133. 
 326 Id. at 132–33 (quoting Romberg, supra note 292, at 251); Jenna C. Smith, 
Comment, “Carving at the Joints”: Using Issue Classes to Reframe Consumer Class 
Actions, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1212–25 (2013) (addressing issue class certification 
issues). 
 327 See Seiner, supra note 265, at 133. 
 328 Id. at 133, 135–36. 
 329 See supra Part IV (discussing facts of the O’Connor decision). 
 330 O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2015 WL 5138097, at *37 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (amended order granting in part and denying in part the motion 
for class certification). 
 331 See supra Part IV. 
 332 See Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, supra note 2; Frizell, supra note 250; 
Peters, supra note 273; Selyukh, supra note 273. 
 333 See Hall & Krueger, supra note 246, at 1; Driving Jobs vs Driving with Uber, supra 
note 2; Frizell, supra note 250. 
 334 See supra Part IV. 
 335 See Seiner, supra note 265, at 122–23. 
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Without more information, it is impossible to frame precisely how the 
issue class could be used in an on-demand case, but it offers enormous 
potential. A court could, for example, resolve the issue—across a case like 
O’Connor—of whether workers that fit a specified set of parameters would be 
employees or independent contractors.336 This would help streamline much of 
the controversy currently present in the case, while still preserving litigation 
on the already identified differences that also exist.337 
Issue class certification offers enormous flexibility and efficiency for the 
courts.338 It permits the judge overseeing the matter another case management 
tool when adjudicating the issues.339 The court can determine which issue(s) 
can be resolved on a broader basis, while leaving the remaining claims to be 
addressed individually.340 Additionally, issue class certification can provide 
efficiency to the proceedings, as common questions are resolved a single time 
without the need to revisit these particular issues.341 This procedural tool thus 
provides “a happy medium between individual cases and a global class 
action.”342  
As the cases continue to emerge in this area, issue class certification 
should be strongly considered, as it seems particularly appropriate for these 
types of technology-sector claims. As the litigation presents common 
companywide policies, personnel, and workplace practices,343 issue class 
certification should be contemplated as a possible procedural tool for the case. 
Issue class certification has already been used effectively in employment class 
action litigation after Wal-Mart.344 Indeed, Judge Posner approved the use of 
this tool in a class case brought against a major brokerage house.345 As the 
court stated in that case:  
                                                                                                                     
 336 See supra Part V.A (discussing the O’Connor decision). 
 337 See supra notes 250–56 and accompanying text. 
 338 See generally Seiner, supra note 265, at 135; David Hill Koysza, Note, Preventing 
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[A] single proceeding . . . could not resolve class members’ claims. Each 
class member would have to prove that his compensation had been adversely 
affected by the corporate policies . . . . But at least it wouldn’t be necessary in 
each of those trials to determine whether the challenged practices were 
unlawful.346  
Just like the employment case before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,347 
many cases that arise in the technology sector will present similar corporate 
policies that can be litigated in an aggregate proceeding. The individual issues, 
damages, and other factual differences can similarly be litigated 
independently.348  
Thus, while this Article proposes a model for assisting the courts to 
determine the breadth of a class action claim,349 it also encourages the use of 
issue class certification to help peel off issues where appropriate. Issue class 
certification can be used independently with the model offered here, or in 
conjunction with it. While the complete extent of the appropriate use of issue 
class certification in the modern economy is well beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is helpful for the courts and litigants to consider using this 
procedural tool.350 This Article thus seeks simply to identify this tool as an 
additional way to help sort through this complex litigation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to provide some clarity to the confused area of class 
action worker misclassification issues in the technology sector. As one federal 
judge recently noted, “[t]he test the . . . courts have developed over the 20th 
Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st 
Century problem.”351 In the modern economy, we have experienced a surge of 
these cases given the varied and uncertain status of the workers involved.352 
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The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in Wal-Mart v. Dukes has only 
served to confuse the area and to raise the bar on the certification issues arising 
in the workplace context.353 This Article provides a streamlined five-part 
framework to help analyze aggregate litigation on the worker misclassification 
issue arising in gig-sector cases.  
Application of this framework will make it clear that the class action 
mechanism should be used cautiously in technology-sector cases. As these 
cases typically involve highly individualized fact patterns,354 it will often be 
more appropriate to litigate these cases on an individualized or more narrow 
class action basis.355 The factors identified here are not exhaustive, and the 
framework is only one way of evaluating these claims. This Article thus seeks 
to open a dialogue in this important and emerging field. 
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